An Analysis of Medium of Exchange in Takeovers. by Liao, Yuan-shing
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1997
An Analysis of Medium of Exchange in Takeovers.
Yuan-shing Liao
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liao, Yuan-shing, "An Analysis of Medium of Exchange in Takeovers." (1997). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 6499.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/6499
?
t
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to 
order.
UMI
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE IN TAKEOVERS
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agriculture and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Interdepartmental Program in Business Administration
by
Yuan-shing Liao 
B.S., National Tsing-Hua University, Taiwan, 1987 
M B A , State University of New York at Buffalo, 1993 
August 1997
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 9808756
UMI Microform 9808756 
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
I
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Professor William R. Lane for directing my graduate studies and 
research problems and for always providing invaluable guidance in developing and 
completing my dissertation.
I also thank other committee members - Professors Faik Koray, Ji-Chai Lin, 
Robert Pedis, and Gary C. Sanger - for providing helpful comments.
Special thanks are given to the I/B/E/S and, particularly, Professor 
George M. Frankfurter for allowing me to use the I/B/E/S database in my dissertation.
Last, but by no means least, I would like to express my appreciation to my 
grandfather, Chin-Shi, my parents, Cheng-Tsz and Lin Hsueh-Tzu, and my brothers and 
sisters, Hon-Bin, Bor-Ruoh, Sharon, and Lilian, for providing love and encouragement 
during my academic studies.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................  ii
List o f Tables..................................................................................................... v
Abstract ............................................................................................................ vii
Chapter 1. Introduction....................................................................................  1
Chapter 2. Information Asymmetries, Certification, and Monitoring ..................  4
2.1. Introduction....................................................................................  4
2.2. Takeovers, medium of exchange, and financial intermediation
2.2.1. Mergers and acquisitions................................................  5
2.2.2. Medium of exchange in takeovers ..................................  9
2.2.2.1. Tax effects.......................................................  9
2.2.2.2. Information asymmetries................................  11
2 .2 .2 .3. Empirical evidence on information asymmetries.. 13
2.2.3. Diformation asymmetry and the role of financial 
intermediaries.................................................................. 15
2.3. A Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses ..........................................  19
2.3.1. A theoretical analysis .................................................... 19
2.3.1.1. The model.........................................................  19
2.3.1.2. Re-evaluation of the bidder's value in a stock offer 
and intermediary quality...................................  23
2.3.1.3. What deters Iow-quality firms from mimicking 
high-quality firms............................................  24
2.3.2. Cash offers versus stock offers........................................  25
2.3.3. Majorfypotheses............................................................ 26
2.4. Method of analysis .......................................................................  28
2.4.1. Measuring the market's reactions to takeovers ...............  28
2.4.1.1. Event study method........................................  28
2.4.1.2. Robustness o f measuring excess returns: mean-
and market-adjusted returns............................ 30
2.4.2. Multivariate regression analysis and variable specifications ..31
2.5. D ata.............................................................................................. 36
2.6. Empirical Results ........................................................................  38
2.6.1. Distribution of the sample................................................  38
2.6.2. Regression results disaggregated by medium of exchange... 43
2.6.3. Regression results for the entire sample........................... 50
2.6.4. Other variables and sensitivity tests.................................  54
2.7. Conclusions..................................................................................  59
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3. Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Takeover Targets and
Medium of Exchange .......................................................................  61
3.1. Introduction..................................................................................  61
32. Related models and empirical evidence..........................................  63
3.3. Foundation o f the analysis.............................................................  6 6
3.3.1. Do analysts continue to issue forecasts for the firms in 
takeover bids as stand-alone entities ? .............................  6 6
3.3.2. Do revisions o f analysts' forecasts of earnings reflect 
changes in the market's expectations ? .............................  67
3.4. Method of Analysis.......................................................................  6 8
3.4.1. Estimating excess earnings forecast revisions.................... 6 8
3.4.2. Alignment between event dates and I/B/E/S earnings 
forecasts............................................................................ 73
3.4.3. Multivariate regression analysis.......................................  73
3.4.4. "Whisper earnings"..........................................................  75
3.5. Data............................................................................................. 77
3.6. Empirical Results.......................................................................... 78
3.7. Conclusions.................................................................................. 92
Chapter 4. Changes in Payment Terms in the Takeover Process .....................  94
4.1. Introduction................................................................................. 94
4.2. Theoretical discussion and empirical hypotheses...........................  95
4.3. Method of analysis ...................................................................... 96
4.3.1. Measuring the announcement excess returns ................... 96
4.3.1.1. Event study method...........................................  96
4.3.1.2. Robustness of measuring excess returns:
mean- and market-adjusted returns.................... 98
4.3.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis...................................  99
4.4. Data............................................................................................... 100
4.5. Empirical results ..............................................................  101
4.5.1. Distribution of the sample..................................................101
4.5.2. Share price reactions to announcements of changes in 
payment method and regression results...........................  106
4.6. Conclusions.................................................................................. 113
Chapter 5. Conclusions....................................................................................... 1 2 0
References..........................................................................................................122
Appendix............................................................................................................127
Vita .................................................................................................................  128
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
List of Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded
industrial firms over January 1989 through December 1995 ........ 39
Table 2 .2 : Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for 324 takeover
announcements from January 1989 to December 1995 ...............  44
Table 2.3: Bidder's two-day announcement cumulative average prediction
errors (CAPE) for 348 takeover announcements over the period 
January 1989 through December 1995.........................................  47
Table 2.4: Estimated coefficients of regressions of cumulative excess returns
surrounding takeover announcements made between January 
1989 through December 1995 disaggregated by the medium of 
exchange.....................................................................................  49
Table 2.5: Estimated coefficients o f regressions cumulative excess returns
surrounding takeover announcements made between January 
1989 through December 1995.....................................................  52
Table 2 .6 : Estimated coefficients o f regressions cumulative excess returns
surrounding takeover announcements where all the accounting 
firms, investment banks, and commercial banks are known  57
Table 3.1: Frequency distribution of the sample of tender offers announced
over the period January 1988 to December 1995 ....................... 79
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of target firms in the sample........................  81
Table 3.3: Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the current forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995:
All offers.....................................................................................  83
Table 3.4: Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the following forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995:
All offers.....................................................................................  84
Table 3.5: Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the current forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995:
Cash offers.................................................................................  86
v
(
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 3.6 : Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the current forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995: 
Combination offers.....................................................................  87
Table 3.7: Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the following forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995:
Cash offers....................................................................................89
Table 3.8: Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of
earnings per share for the following forecast-year for the takeover 
announcements made over January 1988 - December 1995: 
Combination offers...................................................................... 90
Table 3.9: Estimated coefficients of regressions for revisions of analysts'
forecasts of earnings for takeover bids over the period January 
1988 to December 1995 .............................................................. 90
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for the sample of announcements of changes
in payment terms in corporate takeovers made over the period 
January 1976 to December 1995................................................ 102
Table 4.2: Announcement cumulative excess returns disaggregated by
changes in payment terms and of takeover premium....................  107
Table 4.3: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for announcements of changes in
payment terms in takeovers from January 1976 to December 
1995.........................................................................................  109
Table 4.4: Regression analysis for announcements of changes in payment
terms in takeovers over the period January 1976 to December 
1995 ..........................................................................................  112
Table 4.5: Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment terms
over the period January 1976 to December 1995 ........................ 114
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Abstract
This dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the medium of exchange in 
corporate takeovers. Previous theoretical works and empirical evidence suggest three 
distinct (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) elements o f information asymmetry: the 
bidder's value, the target's value, and the synergy from a takeover. Chapter two of this 
dissertation integrates the theory of financial intermediation into the research of the 
medium of exchange in takeovers. The research question is how the bidders with 
favorable information employ financial intermediaries, such as accounting firms, 
investment banks, and commercial banks, to reduce the market's unfavorable reaction to 
announcements of equity-financed takeovers. Chapter three examines whether the 
method of payment conveys information about the value of the target firms. Chapter 
four analyzes the information content of changes in payment terms in the takeover 
process.
Results in chapter two indicate that the existence of high-quality financial 
intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, of bidders reduces the market's 
unfavorable reaction to announcements of equity-financed takeovers, hi stock offers, the 
bidders' announcement excess returns are a positive function of bidders' commercial 
banking relationship. The evidence on accounting firms and investment banks is not 
found.
Evidence in chapter three does not support the notion that the method of 
payment in takeovers conveys information about the value of the target companies.
vii
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Revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for the target firms at announcements of 
tender offers involving stock as the method of payment are similar to those at 
announcements of cash tender offers. This suggests that if there is any information 
revealed by the medium of exchange in takeovers, the information is unlikely to be about 
the value of the targets.
Results in chapter four are consistent with the notion that changes in the medium 
of exchange in takeovers reveal information about the value of the bidders. After 
controlling for changes in the takeover premium which accompany the revisions of 
payment terms, bidders' announcement excess returns are approximately two percent 
lower for increases in the stock component than for increases in the cash component. 
Taken together, the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that the medium of 
exchange in takeovers conveys information about the bidders' value rather than the 
targets' value.
viii
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions combine the resources of two separate corporate 
entities. The bidder can choose from cash, stock or a combination of both as the method 
of payment Over the past few years, several papers have provided hypotheses to 
explain the motivation behind the choice of medium of exchange in corporate takeovers. 
Two of the strongest involve the revelation of private managerial information and 
consideration of the tax consequences of the acquisition. Extant literature (Travlos, 
1987, Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, and Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) reports that the 
use of stock to finance a takeover conveys unfavorable information about the value of 
the bidder because the market views that the bidder managers, acting in the best interests 
of shareholders, would not issue equity unless these managers believe the bidder's 
common shares to be overvalued in the market. The information theories on the medium 
of exchange in takeovers are not confined to whether the medium of exchange conveys 
information about the bidder's value. Several theoretical works have centered on 
elements other than the bidder's value as the focus of information asymmetry. For 
example, Fishman (1989) theorizes that the method of payment in takeovers conveys 
information about the synergy from a takeover. Hansen (1987) provides a model where 
the information advantage possessed by the bidder and the target about the value of their 
own firms determines the choice of the medium of exchange in a takeover.
1
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2Secondly, there are tax considerations associated with the method of payment in 
takeovers (Carleton, Guilkey, Harris, and Stewart, 1983, Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 
1983, and Huang and Walkling, 1987). A cash takeover creates an immediate capital 
gains tax for shareholders o f the target firms, while an equity-financed acquisition defers 
the tax payment until the new shares are sold.
This dissertation provides a detailed empirical analysis of information theories on 
the medium of exchange in takeovers. Chapter two integrates the theory o f financial 
intermediation into the takeover research. The question addressed is how the bidders 
with favorable information utilize financial intermediaries to reduce the market's 
unfavorable reactions to announcements of equity-financed takeovers. For example, a 
bidder might decide to use common shares to finance a takeover because o f requests by 
the target's shareholders (because of tax consideration discussed above) rather than 
bidder managerial belief that the bidder's shares are overvalued. Thus, bidders with 
favorable information in stock offers have an incentive to differentiate themselves from 
those with unfavorable information in stock offers. The theory of financial 
intermediation calls for the use of high-quality financial intermediaries to certify high- 
quality bidders in stock offers. The empirical results, particularly those on commercial 
banks, are generally consistent with this view.
Chapter three examines whether the method of payment in takeovers conveys 
information about the value of the target's common shares. Previous studies analyze the 
stock returns of the target. When using this stock return approach, however, it is 
difficult to examine whether the method of payment reflects the value o f the target
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3because target's announcement excess returns combine any information effects with the 
tax effects (as above) associated with the medium of exchange. Thus, chapter three 
analyzes whether the revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for the targets depend on 
the method of payment Analysts' reactions to announcements of tender offers involving 
stock as the medium of exchange are found to be similar to those to announcements of 
cash tender offers. Thus, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the method 
of payment conveys information about the value of target's assets.
Chapter four analyzes changes in the medium of exchange in the takeover 
process. The research question is whether the decision to alter the medium of exchange 
in takeovers conveys information about the value of the bidders. The results indicate 
that, after controlling for changes in takeover premium which accompany revisions of the 
medium of exchange, bidders' announcement excess returns are approximately two 
percent lower for increases in the stock component than for increases in the cash 
component. Thus, changes in payment terms in takeovers reveal information about the 
value of the bidders.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the choice of the medium of exchange 
in takeovers reflects the value o f the bidders rather than the targets. Furthermore, 
financial intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, monitor and certify the bidder's 
decision to issue common shares to finance mergers and acquisitions. The higher the 
bidder's commercial banking relationship, the more favorable the market's reaction to an 
announcement of a stock offer.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
Information Asymmetries, Certification, and Monitoring
2.1. Introduction
Studies of the medium of exchange in takeovers have provided two major 
explanations why managers of bidding companies choose equity or cash to finance 
acquisitions: (1) target shareholders' tax consequences associated with the choice of 
payment method to finance takeovers, and (2 ) private information about the value of the 
firms involved in takeovers. Recent studies on financial intermediaries argue that 
intermediaries mitigate similar problems arising from corporate insiders' private 
information about firm value. The integration of this area of research into takeovers, 
however, is largely unexplored.
This paper integrates the theory of financial intermediation into the takeover 
research by examining whether the presence of high-quality financial intermediaries 
reduces the information problems associated with stock financing in takeovers. This 
paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze how the market uses the choice of 
financial intermediaries to alter the valuation of the firm upon announcements of equity- 
financed investment projects, including takeovers. The model shows that the value of 
external monitoring in stock offers should exceed that in cash offers. This study also 
provides further empirical evidence consistent with the view that the presence of 
recognized and reputable outside monitors, particularly commercial banks, reduces the 
adverse selection problem associated with the use of common shares to finance
4
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5investment projects. The share price reactions to announcements of stock offers are 
found to be a positive function of the bidders' commercial banking relationship. 
Furthermore, the value of external monitoring generated by commercial banks is 
concentrated in takeovers that are financed by common shares. The results on 
investment banks and auditors are considerably weaker. These findings are robust with 
respect to specifications of bidders' announcement excess returns, and inclusion of 
previously tested variables relating to characteristics o f takeovers and seasoned equity 
offerings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related 
extant literature. Section 2.3 sets out a theoretical analysis and hypotheses. Sections 2.4 
and 2.5 discuss the method of empirical analysis and data collection. Section 2.6 
presents empirical results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 2.7.
2.2. Takeovers, medium of exchange, and financial intermediation
2.2.1. Mergers and acquisitions
Corporate takeovers are frequently viewed as an arena in which managerial teams 
compete for the rights to manage corporate resources, hi their review of the literature 
on mergers and acquisitions, Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that corporate 
takeovers generate positive value gains, that target shareholders benefit, and that bidder 
shareholders do not lose, hi addition, the gains created by takeovers, on average, do not 
appear to come from the creation of market power. The two most likely sources of 
gains to bidders are synergy and undervalued targets. Bidders, however, can be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6motivated to acquire a target for reasons not related to either synergy or the target's 
undervaluation.
The key question is how to explain the value gains from mergers and 
acquisitions. Bradley (1980) studies the stock price behavior around interfirm tender 
offers and concludes that synergy is the dominant source of value gains. He views the 
tender offer as a bid for the right to manage the resources of the target firm in a 
competitive market for corporate control. Bradley argues that corporate "raiding" (i.e. 
the bidder profiting from purchasing a majority of the target firm's assets at a price that is 
lower than their intrinsic value) is not an important explanation for interfirm tender offers 
because the post-execution (referring to the tender offer per se) market price of the 
target’s shares is significantly higher than its pre-announcement level. If corporate 
"raiding" were an important explanation for interfirm tender offers, the market price of 
the target share subsequent to a successful tender-offer would be lower than its pre- 
announcement level. Bradley also finds that the shareholders of successful acquiring 
firms realize a capital gain as a result of the acquisition of the target’s shares. These 
gains, however, are not realized through the market appreciation in the purchased target 
shares. While the post-execution market price of the target shares is significantly higher 
than its pre-announcement level, the post-execution price is significantly less than the 
share price paid by the acquiring firm. The fact that the acquisition of the target shares 
(which is a financial loss on paper) is a positive net-present-value investment suggests 
that the value of the control of the target shares stems not from these shares' 
proportional claims to the target's net cash flows but rather from the reallocation of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7target's resources. Thus, Bradley interprets these results as consistent with a synergy 
interpretation o f interfirm tender offers.
The other possible motive for mergers and acquisitions is that managers of 
bidding firms have private information about the targets' intrinsic value that is not 
impounded in the targets' share prices. Although previous studies suggest that the 
private-information hypothesis is unlikely to folly explain the magnitude of value gains 
from takeovers, this hypothesis cannot be ruled out. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) 
analyze successful versus unsuccessful interfirm tender offers. The results indicate that 
the permanent positive revaluation of the target shares following unsuccessful bids is due 
primarily to the emergence of or the expectation of another bid that would ultimately 
lead to the transfer of control of the targets' resources. The rejection of a tender offer is 
found to have differential effects on the share prices of unsuccessful bidders, depending 
on whether the tender offers result in an ultimate change in the control of the targets' 
resources. It is concluded that tender offers are attempts by bidders to exploit potential 
synergies, not merely private information about the targets1 intrinsic value.
Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) use option pricing theory to analyze 
interfirm cash tender offers and also find that the information hypothesis is insufficient to 
explain the magnitude of value gains from cash tender offers. Bhagat, Brickley, and 
Loewenstein view target shareholders as holding a put option on the target's shares 
during the post-announcement but pre-expiration period (tender period). The observed 
target's market share prices are for a portfolio consisting of the underlying stock and the 
put option. The target's underlying (not observed) stock price subsequent to the tender
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8offer announcement is calculated by using an option pricing model and found to be 
significantly higher than the pre-announcement stock price. Thus, the put option is an 
important component of the announcement-period return. These results suggest that the 
bidder and target have synergies that allow the bidder to make a bid that is substantially 
higher than the pre-announcement target's stock price.
On the other hand, Brous and Kini (1993) continue the argument that a takeover 
announcement conveys information about the target's intrinsic value. They examine 
analysts' earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and report that the 
announcement-month earnings forecasts are systematically revised upward. This 
suggests that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the value of 
the target firms. In addition, excess forecast revisions are significantly higher for targets 
with low Tobin's 9 -ratios than for targets with high 9 -ratios, lending further support to 
the signaling hypothesis (assuming that the lower the 9 -ratio of a firm, the more likely 
the firm is undervalued in the market).
Alternatively, managers of acquiring firms could merely seek prestige and 
monetary rewards associated with managing  a large corporation, regardless of whether 
the acquisitions are value-enhancing for shareholders. Roll (1986) argues that managers 
of acquiring companies over-estimate their abilities to manage the target firms. 
Consequently, bidders acquire the target firms by paying a price that is more than the 
targets' actual worth to the acquiring firms. In addition, Jensen (1986) also contends that 
managers who have little ownership of the firm have incentives to invest in projects that 
benefit themselves.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92.2.2. Medium of exchange in takeovers
2.2.2.I. Tax effects
A cash takeover creates an immediate liability for capital gains tax for 
shareholders of target companies, while an equity-financed acquisition defers taxes until 
the new shares are sold. Carleton et a l (1983), Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983), and 
Huang and Walkling (1987) argue that this tax effect predicts a larger takeover premium 
for cash acquisitions than for acquisitions that use equity for payment. Bidders are 
willing to pay the higher cash price because the cash payment allows the acquiring firms 
to "write up" the tax bases of some of the acquired assets when their fair market value 
exceeds book value. This would result in higher depreciation expenses and, thus, higher 
after-tax cash flows for the acquiring firms.
Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) examine the differences in returns to target 
firms after controlling for both merger type and method of payment, and report evidence 
consistent with the tax effect. They find that shareholders of target firms in cash 
transactions earn, on average, 33.54 percent excess returns from 40 days prior to the 
original takeover announcement through the announcement day. This number is almost 
twice the excess return (17.47 percent) earned by shareholders of target firms when the 
takeovers are financed by equity. Wansley, Lane, and Yang attribute this return 
difference to three factors: (1) a tax effect that requires a larger takeover premium for 
cash transactions than for securities-financed ones to compensate target company 
shareholders for capital gains tax burdens; (2 ) regulatory requirements that favor cash as 
the medium of exchange (because, unlike cash acquisitions, securities-financed bids must
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have a registration statement approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission); 
and (3) the increasing popularity of cash takeovers during a period of generally higher 
takeover premiums.
Huang and Walkling (1987) provide further evidence supportive o f this tax 
effect. Huang and Walkling avoid expost selection and classification bias by focusing on 
the original rather than subsequent announcements. They also control for the 
interdependence of payment method, acquisition type (Le. tender offer or merger), and 
target's managerial resistance. After controlling for acquisition type and managerial 
resistance, Haung and Walkling still find that announcement excess returns earned by 
target firms in cash offers are significantly higher than those in stock offers. The results 
lend additional and strong credence to the tax hypothesis.
Other empirical evidence on tax effects (particularly, on the bidder's side) is less 
clear. For example, Carleton et at. (1983) report that "lower dividend payout ratios and 
lower market-to-book ratios increase the probability o f being acquired in a cash takeover 
relative to being acquired via an exchange of securities" (p. 825). They further argue 
that the association of a high market-to-book ratio with the security payment partially 
supports the tax effect argument because market-to-book ratios approximate the level of 
capital gains liabilities o f target company shareholders. That is, the higher the market-to- 
book ratio, the higher the potential capital gains liabilities, and, thus, the more 
advantageous are equity securities for payment. On the other hand, this finding is 
inconsistent with another aspect of the tax effect in that a high market-to-book ratio also 
represents a potential large tax saving to the bidder arising from the write-up of target
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assets to their fair market values. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) use three different 
measures for the potential tax benefits of the write-up of acquired assets, and report that 
none of the measures are statistically significant or important in explaining the choice of 
the method o f payment in takeover bids.
2.2J2.2. Information asymmetries
Myers and Majluf(1984) address the information asymmetry between the firm's 
managers and outside investors over the value of the firm's shares. Myers and Majluf 
claim that the market believes that managers, acting in the best interests of shareholders, 
will not issue equity unless they view the shares of their firms to be overvalued in the 
market. Thus, in a takeover, the market would interpret the use of the acquirer’s shares 
to finance takeovers as unfavorable information about the value of those shares, while 
the use of cash signals positive information.
Fishman (1987) assumes that both the bidder and the target have private 
information about the valuation of the target (operated as part of the bidder).
Additionally, there exists a cost of collecting information about the valuation for the 
target, and there are two potential bidders for a target, implying that a takeover offer will 
bring forth potential competition for the target. Under these settings, when the bidder 
has information that the target has a high valuation, the bidder will use cash to pre-empt 
a competing bid. (The pre-empting role of cash arises from the assumption that a 
competing bidder's expected payoff from the takeover is decreasing in the initial bidder's 
valuation for the target.) When the bidder's information about the valuation for the 
target is less optimistic, the bidder will use equity as the payment method to solicit the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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private information possessed by the target (about the valuation for the target operated 
as part of the bidder).
Hansen (1987) emphasizes the importance o f information asymmetry between the 
target's managers and outside investors about the value of the target's assets. In 
Hansen's theory, when the target firm has private information that the acquirer does not 
have about the target's value, for every cash offer that is acceptable (i.e. wealth 
increasing) to the acquirer, there exists a stock offer that dominates that cash offer. That 
is, the expected wealth of the stock offer exceeds that of the cash offer. Thus, bidder's 
managers prefer stock to cash as the payment method in order to mitigate the adverse 
selection problem arising from the target's managers having superior information about 
the value of target's assets.
A non-trivial question is why do we observe any cash offers ? Hansen reconciles 
his theory with this empirical observation by introducing into his model the tax effect 
associated with payment method (discussed above). In the presence of a tax effect, the 
optimal choice of payment method (cash or stock) faced by the bidder depends on the 
relative importance of the tax effect and private information possessed by the target firm. 
Another means to reconcile Hansen's theory with the empirical observation of some cash 
offers is to allow the acquirer to have private information about the value of its assets.
Like the tax effect, the information advantage on the acquirer side reduces the 
importance of private information possessed by the target.
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2.2.23. Empirical evidence on information asymmetries
Empirical evidence supports Myers and Majhifs (1984) argument for the method 
of financing in takeovers, while evidence for Hansen's (1987) and Fishman's (1989) 
arguments is less clear. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) and Travlos (1987) present 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the payment method conveys information 
about the value of the bidding firm. Wansley, Lane, and Yang examine both pre-bid 
cumulative average prediction errors (iCAPE) and announcement effects to bidders in 
cash and securities transactions. For acquisitions using securities for payment, the excess 
returns to bidders from 40 days prior to through 40 days after the takeover 
announcement day total -1.51 percent (f-value -1.07), while for cash acquisitions, the 
excess returns total 6.17 percent (f-value -  2.31) over the same examination period. 
Furthermore, the announcement effects, the excess returns from 1 day prior to through 
the announcement day, are significantly positive for the cash bids but significantly 
negative for securities-financed bids. Wansley, Lane, and Yang conclude that the 
evidence is generally consistent with the notion that "when the bidding firm's 
management considers its own stock to be overvalued (undervalued), securities (cash) 
will be relatively more attractive as a payment method" (p. 412).
Travlos (1987) also provides evidence supportive of the information effect of 
payment method in takeovers on the value of bidding firm. He finds that equity-financed 
takeover bids are associated with significantly negative announcement prediction errors 
to bidders, while cash offers are associated with positive prediction errors, irrespective of 
the type of takeover bid (merger or tender offer). Furthermore, nonconvertible bonds of
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bidding firms that utilize equity for payment experience significantly negative prediction 
errors at the takeover announcement, while those of bidders that use cash to finance 
takeovers experience slightly positive prediction errors. Cross-sectional analyses 
indicate that the announcement-period prediction errors of bidders are significantly 
negatively related to the proportion of the transaction financed by common shares of 
bidding companies. Travlos concludes that "the evidence is consistent with the findings 
provided by the empirical literature on new offerings of common stock" {p. 944) and that 
"the market interprets a cash offer as good news and a common stock exchange offer as 
bad news about the bidders' true value" (p. 944).
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) analyze divestitures following acquisitions 
completed between 1971 and 1982, and conclude that their evidence "is consistent with 
the idea that stock financing of an acquisition is a negative signal of the acquirer's value, 
rather than a negative signal about the acquisition” (p. 126). Specifically, they find that 
bidder abnormal returns are 3.52% lower (significant at the 1% level) for equity-financed 
acquisitions than for cash acquisitions, and that the ex post success of acquisitions (based 
on whether the targets are subsequently divested because of their poor performance) is 
independent of the type of payment method in acquisitions. That is, the cash acquisitions 
are as likely to be poorly performing as are securities-financed ones. The latter result 
does not support Fishman's (1989) theory that bidding firms use cash to acquire highly- 
valued targets.
Empirical evidence on whether the medium of exchange in takeovers signals the 
value of the target’s shares is provided by Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994), who
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analyze the relation between the method of payment and valuation effects associated
with terminated merger proposals. These authors report significantly higher cumulative
excess returns for the target’s shareholders after termination o f cash offers than after
termination of stock offers even 250 days after termination when no subsequent takeover
*
bids follow. The evidence, however, is weak because it is rarefy announced which party 
(i.e. the bidder or the target) terminates the deal. The identity of the party calling off the 
deal is important because a deal canceled by the bidder conveys exactly the opposite 
information (about the target's value) than does a deal canceled by the target.
2.2.3. Information asymmetry and the role of financial intermediaries
The presumption of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and 
outside investors about the value of the firm has given rise to the development of models 
that argue that financial intermediaries expend resources to gather private information to 
evaluate and monitor corporate activities. This section reviews the literature on the role 
of three types of financial intermediaries: investment banks, commercial banks, and 
accounting firms.
Diamond (1984), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), among others, argue 
that bank loans impound asymmetric information and provide monitoring services. In 
their models, banks process private information to evaluate and monitor borrowing firms 
at lower costs than other market participants. Diamond argues that a financial 
intermediary such as a bank has a cost advantage in processing the private information 
about corporate activities because the alternative is either duplication of effort if each 
security-holder (e.g., atomistic shareholders) monitors directly, or a free-rider problem,
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in which case no security-holder monitors. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that 
if information asymmetries are present, banks can enhance the welfare for the society as 
a whole by rectifying these asymmetries. Special attention is paid to some mechanisms, 
such as forming a coalition, employed by intermediaries to reduce the uncertain payoff 
nature associated with gathering information. Further, Fama (1985) argues that the 
periodic and short-term nature of bank loans reduces the needs of other security-holders 
to perform costly monitoring and evaluation of corporate activities because other 
security-holders can periodically infer the value of borrowing firms by observing the 
willingness of banks to grant borrowers renewals of short-term loans.
Titman and Trueman (1986) theorize that in the presence of information 
asymmetry, accounting firms gather private information to certify corporate activities.
An important element of Titman and Trueman's model is that the higher the quality of a 
financial intermediary, the more weight the market places on the information produced 
by this intermediary. Managers with favorable asymmetric information find it optimal to 
hire high-quality auditors to confirm managers' favorable private information, while 
managers with unfavorable inside information would choose low-quality auditors over 
high-quality ones in the fear that high-quality auditors would be more likely to detect and 
reveal the unfavorable private information.
Titman and Trueman (1986) contend that the argument of managerial choice of 
accounting firms can be applied to the choice of investment banks, namely that the 
choice of investment banks signals the quality of managers' private information about the 
firm’s value. Investment banks that underwrite unseasoned equity offerings have
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reputation at stake, and earn a return on this reputation. It is shown that reputable 
managers (or entrepreneurs) with favorable asymmetric information find it optimal to 
retain high-quality investment banks to confirm the quality of the private information. 
Conversely, managers with unfavorable private information will choose low-quality 
investment banks to underwrite the issues because high-quality investment banks would 
be more likely to detect and reveal this unfavorable private information. Thus, 
managerial choice of investment banks signals the quality o f managers' information about 
the firm’s value.
Several financial economists also argue that investment banks use their reputation 
to certify that the offer price in an equity issuance is consistent with private information. 
Booth and Smith (1986) analyze the cost of underwriter certification, and develop a 
theory of the role of investment banks in certifying that risky prices reflect adverse inside 
information. Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that high-quality investment banks only 
underwrite high-quality and low-risk issues, implying that the choice of investment banks 
for underwriting an equity offering signals the inside information about the firm’s value.
In a world of incomplete information, managers with favorable private 
information have an incentive to employ credible mechanisms by which outside investors 
can infer the quality of the private information and the value of the firm. This self­
sorting process leads to a shift from a lemons' market, as described in Akerlof (1970), 
where assets are priced with average risk of all assets in a category (e.g. used cars as a 
category) to a 'separating' equilibrium where assets are priced according to their asset- 
specific risks, resulting in an improvement in information efficiency.
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Empirical evidence supports the notion that financial intermediaries, such as 
investment banks, commercial banks, and accounting firms, provide valuable monitoring 
and certification services that mitigate the problems arising from the information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors about the firm’s value. James 
(1987) presents empirical evidence that bank loans impound private information and 
monitoring services. He reports that the borrowing firms experience statistically 
significant positive excess returns when new bank credit agreements or expansions of 
existing bank loan agreements are announced. Beatty and Ritter (1986) report evidence 
supportive of the notion that investment banks which misprice initial public offerings 
subsequently lose market share of underwriting business. This result emphasizes the 
importance of investment banks’ reputation in the process of underwriting equity 
offerings. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) find that the market reaction to 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings varies with the presence of accounting 
firms, commercial banks, and underwriters. They find that the prediction errors of the 
firms that announced seasoned equity offerings are positively related to the quantity of 
bank debt in a firm's capital structure, the quality o f the investment bank that underwrites 
the issue, and the quality of the accounting firm that audits the firm. The evidence is 
consistent with the notion that commercial banks, underwriters, and auditors perform 
monitoring and certification roles in the security issuance process.
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13. A Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
2.3.1. A theoretical analysis
23.1.1. The model
A model to analyze how financial intermediaries serves to convey information in 
a firm's decision to issue shares to finance investment projects, such as takeovers, is 
developed from Titman and Trueman's theory (1986) of entrepreneurs' choice of 
intermediary quality in new shares offerings. This analysis differs from Titman and 
Trueman's model in that the bidder maximizes the value of the firm given the bidder's 
private information, while, in Titman and Trueman, entrepreneurs maximize expected 
utility.
Basic assumptions of this model are: (1), the focus of information asymmetry is 
about the value of the bidder's shares, not about the value of the target's shares or 
synergy. (2 ), the market places more weight on the information provided by high-quality 
intermediaries than on the information by low-quality intermediaries. Titman and 
Trueman (1986) argue that high-quality intermediaries expend more resources to process 
private information, and, thus, would be able to offer a more precise and trustworthy 
estimate of a firm's prospects. (3), investors (including bidder's shareholders) are risk- 
neutral. This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. The implication of this 
assumption is that investors are indifferent between taking the expected value of a 
gamble with certainty and taking the gamble itself (a gamble is a payoff structure with 
uncertain outcome). Bidder's managers are assumed to act in the best interest of their 
shareholders.
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Suppose the bidder has decided to acquire the target The bidder will produce a 
random cash flow c at the end o f the period. The market updates its belief about the 
value of c upon the arrival of information (or signal) related to c.
The bidder receives private information about c through observing the signal i. 
That is, given c,
7 = c + e  i (1)
where e i ~ N(0,1/A) and is independent of c. Assuming that the prior distribution c is 
diffuse, the posterior distribution conditional on i is normal with mean i and variance l/h.
Although outside investors do not have the same information access as corporate 
insiders do, investors receive useful information from other sources. One source is the 
inform ation revealed or disclosed by financial intermediaries (such as auditors, 
commercial banks, and investment banks) that have access to corporate activities. For 
example, (1), the market participants can observe the willingness of commercial banks to 
make loans to the bidders as a signal of how lending banks view the prospects of the 
bidders. (2 ), accounting firms summarize their estimates about the bidders' activities in 
the financial reports. (3), bidders' investment banks provide their assessments about the 
bidders' corporate activities in the negotiation process in takeovers. Observing such 
information generates investors' assessment of a firm's cash flow. Specifically, given c, 
the investors' estimate of a firm's cash flow is:
tc=c+ s 2 (2 )
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where e 2~ N(0, Vq) and is independent of c. q is the quality of an intermediary. 
Assuming that the prior distribution c is diffuse, the posterior distribution conditional on 
;ris normal with mean rrand variance \!q . e  i is assumed to be independent o ie  2.
Investors can estimate the firm's end-of-period cash flow, c, by taking into 
account the bidder's optimal choice of intermediary quality. This is sustainable if the 
choice of intermediary quality is a strictly increasing function of bidder's private 
information, /. Under this scenario, investors would be able to infer the bidder's private 
information / from the knowledge of the intermediary quality, q , optimally chosen by 
bidder. This inference,^*), is such that:
A q )  = i (3)
Investors have two sources o f information to estimate the firm's cash flow, c. 
information released by the intermediary, and the firm's choice of intermediary quality. 
Under the notion that high-quality intermediaries expend more resources to process the 
information and have higher reputation capital at stake than lower-quality intermediaries 
do, the former are presumed to offer a more precise estimate of c. Thus, the market will 
place more weight on the information provided by high-quality intermediaries. Investors' 
re-assessment of c upon an announcement of stock offer is then characterized by:
E(c 1* ?•)=*(?V+ (l- (4)
where
K q )  = q H q + h )  (5)
Equation (5) implies that the higher the intermediary quality, q, the more weight the 
market will place on the information the intermediary produces.
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Because investors are risk-neutral, the re-evaluation of the bidder's value before 
the intermediary cost, m{q), is :
v{x, q)=E{c\7t,qm) (6)
The bidder acts in the best interests of its shareholders. Thus, the bidder 
maximizes its market value after the intermediary cost given the private information, /, it 
observes. Equivalently, the bidder maximizes the market's re-evaluation of the bidder's 
shares, net of intermediary cost, given /:
E(fH  i)~  E(v(x; m(q) (7)
The bidder pays m(q) for the services provided by intermediary. m(q) increases with 
intermediary quality, q, i.e. m' (q) > 0, reflecting the notion that the higher the quality of 
an intermediary, the higher the intermediation cost
Differentiating equation (7 ) with respect to q gives the first-order condition for 
the optimal choice of intermediary quality;
0 -Aq)) h/(q + hf+ hf'iq) I (q + h)-m'(q) = 0 (8)
The choice of q will correctly reveal the bidder's private information, /, if there is 
a strictly increasing function/^?) which simultaneously satisfies equation (3) and (8 ). 
Substituting equation (3) into (8) and solving fbr/fc") yields investors' inference 
schedule as:
r .  ir/m+h)dt/h +  z (9)
where z is the constant term obtained from the integral process. qmm is the lowest level 
of intermediary quality.
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Differentiating equation (9) with respect to q yields:
/ ' ( q )  = m '(q*)(? + h)fh  > 0  (1 0)
The equation above holds because the cost function of the use of intermediary, m(q), is 
an increasing function of the intermediary quality, q.
Equation (10) implies that, first, the investors' inference function,^*), about the 
bidder's private information, /, is a one-to-one function in mathematical terms. Should 
the inference function not be a one-to-one function, investors would be unable to 
correctly infer the private information possessed by corporate insiders. This is because a 
non-one-to-one function may have the cases where two different values of q have the 
same value of /. Second, the inference function is a strictly positive function in q . Thus, 
cross-sectionally, the better the bidder's private information, the higher the intermediary 
quality chosen by the bidder's managers.
2.3.1.2. Re-evaluation of the bidder's value in a stock offer and intermediary 
quality
Cross-sectionally, the market's re-assessment of the bidder's value in stock offers 
is a strictly positive function of the bidder's choice of intermediary quality. That is, the 
market uses the information of the intermediary quality chosen by a bidder to alter the re- 
evaluation of the bidder's shares: the higher the choice of intermediary quality made by a 
bidder, the more favorable the market's reaction to an announcement of a stock offer.
i
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Proof:
Substituting^*) -  i into equation (7) yields:
Kq) / + ( i - Kq) )Aq) - = Aq*) - rta)  ( i i)
Differentiating equation (11) with respect to q  and using equation (10) gives the 
following result:
{q)(q +h) f h- m’ = (g/h)m’( ? ) > 0  (12) 
Equation (12) holds because of the fact ?*> 0 , A > 0 , and the assumption mr (?*)
> 0. The intuition of equation (12) is that the market's reaction to announcements of 
stock offers increases with q ', the optimal choice of intermediary quality made by the 
bidders.
2.3.I.3. What deters low-qualhy firms from mimicking high-quality firms
A separating equilibrium is such that a bidder (denoted as bidder I) with less 
favorable private information finds it not worthwhile to mimic another bidder (bidder 2) 
with more favorable information The intuition is that if bidder 1 did mimic bidder 2, the 
high-quality intermediary would have revealed the less favorable information possessed 
by bidder 1.
Analysis:
Observe equations (4) and (5).
Consider two bidders: bidder 1 has less favorable information than bidder 2.
Bidder 2 optimally chooses the intermediary quality, q2, according to equation (8 ), where 
the subscript indicates the bidder. This implies that the marginal net benefits of using 
the next higher-quality intermediary are zero (or, slightly negative, to be technically
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correct). Marginal net benefits are measured by changes in the firm's value minus 
changes in intermediary cost as a result of employing a higher-quality intermediary.
If bidder /  did mimic bidder 2 by choosing the same intermediary quality, q2, 
used by bidder 2 , it2 is expected to be less than m (where the subscript denotes the 
bidder) because the information generated by the intermediary for firm 1 is expected to 
be less favorable than for firm 2. With the same_/(?z), k(g2) and intermediation costs 
m(q2) for both firms at q2, expected value of bidder 1 is strictly lower than that of firm 2 .
Since the marginal net benefits of bidder 2 at q2 are zero, the marginal net 
benefits of bidder 1 at q2 must be strictly negative. This implies that, to maximize its 
market value, bidder I  will choose a lower intermediary quality qi < q2.
In summary, it is the difference in marginal benefits (rather than marginal costs) 
of the use of intermediaries that deters such mimicking.
2.3.2. Cash offers versus stock offers
The difference between a cash offer and a stock offer is that investors do not 
confer with any private information to evaluate cash, while investors rely on indications 
of insiders' private information to set the value of new common shares. Since, unlike a 
stock offer, a cash offer incurs no information problems at all, the value of external 
monitoring in a stock offer should exceed that in a cash offer.
The price reaction of bidders' shares in response to the announcement of stock 
financing of a takeover likely reflects both the information effect and the investment 
effect from a takeover. This study does not argue for a zero investment effect from a 
takeover, but rather assumes that the investment effect, on average, is unaffected by
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medium of exchange in the absence of competition among bidding firms. Prior studies 
on the medium of exchange in takeovers (such as Travlos, 1987, and Wansley, Lane, and 
Yang, 1987) also implicitly make such an assumption.
2.3.3. Major hypotheses
Both theoretical model (Myers and Majluf 1984) and empirical evidence 
(Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, and Travlos, 1987) support the notion that the market 
interprets the decision to issue equity to finance a takeover as an unfavorable signal 
about the value of the bidding firm's shares. Conversely, the market views the use of 
cash as the payment method as favorable (or, at least not negative) information about the 
value of the bidders' shares. Thus, financial intermediaries should play an important role 
in addressing at least two problems associated with equity-financed takeovers: adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
When a takeover is financed by the bidder's stock, an adverse selection problem 
arises because managers of the bidding firm are more informed than outside investors 
(including managers and shareholders of the target firm) about the value of bidder's 
shares. Titman and Trueman (1986) and Booth and Smith (1986) theorize that 
investment banks certify the quality of private information in the process of underwriting 
equity offerings and, therefore, help facilitate the self-sorting of managers with favorable 
asymmetric information. Similarly, the analysis in section 2.3.1 argues that, in equity- 
financed takeovers, a bidder with favorable private information finds it optimal to employ 
a high-quality investment bank to confirm that it is o f a high value.
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Titman and Trueman (1986) and the analysis in section 2.3.1 theorize that the 
choice of auditors (accounting firms) signals the quality o f corporate insiders' private 
information about the firm’s value. When the bidder's managers use securities to finance 
takeovers, an adverse selection problem arises because these managers know more about 
the value of their firms than do outsiders. As discussed bisection 2.3.1, the certification 
performed by high-quality auditors facilitates self selection of the firms with favorable 
private information. Thus, the reputation of auditors can mitigate the adverse selection 
problem associated with stock financing of a takeover.
When a takeover is financed by bidder's equity, shareholders of target firms face a 
potential moral hazard problem because the bidder's share value depends on the 
managerial efforts subsequent to the stock offer. Banking theory predicts that 
commercial banks can effectively mitigate a moral hazard problem associated with 
equity-financed takeovers. Theoretical models such as those of Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Fama (1985) argue that bank loans impound 
private information and that commercial banks are monitors of corporate activities in the 
lending process because of the banks’ cost advantage of monitoring and the short-term 
nature of bank loans. Because bank monitoring generates benefits for other security 
holders (including atomistic shareholders) throughout the life of bank loans, it reduces 
the moral hazard problem associated with external financing. Based on this line of 
reasoning, managers ofbidding firms with unfavorable private information or high tastes 
for consuming excessive perquisites find bank loans (which entail monitoring) costly, 
while those with favorable asymmetric information or low tastes for perquisites
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consumption employ bank loans to differentiate themselves from others. A test of the
theory o f financial intermediation within the context of the medium of exchange in 
takeovers is equivalent to the tests o f following two arguments. One, as argued above, 
within the group of equity-financed takeovers, the market reaction to a stock offer for 
the bidder that uses high-quality financial intermediaries should be more favorable (or 
less unfavorable) than that for the bidder that employs low-quality intermediaries.
Two, for all the takeover announcements, the benefits of external monitoring in 
stock offers should exceed those, if any, in cash offers. This is because the market views 
a stock offer, but not cash offer, as a negative signal about the firm's value (Myers and 
Majlu£ 1984). Thus, in a cash offer, the benefits provided by financial intermediaries to 
resolve any problem of information asymmetry are largely reduced. The effect of the 
presence and reputation of financial intermediation on the bidder's share price reaction to 
a takeover announcement measures these monitoring benefits.
2.4. Method of analysis
2.4.1. Measuring the market's reactions to takeovers
2.4.1.1. Event study method
Stock price reactions to announcements of takeover bids are measured by 
standard event study methodology as described in Brown and Warner (1985). Under the 
assumption of semi-strong form market efficiency, the announcement effects provide an 
unbiased estimate of the market's valuation adjustments in response to the information 
contained in the announcement.
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For the 200-trading-day estimation period (t=-250, -51; where t= 0  represents the 
event's first appearance date in the Watt Street Journal), market model parameters are 
obtained by regressing individual daily returns on the corresponding equal-weighted daily 
market index returns, which are provided by the CRSP files. The market model is 
defined as:
R jt=aj+ bjR ^+ ( 1 3 )
where:
Rjt = rate of return for security j on day t,
Rmt= rate of return for the market index on day t,
Oj = mean return not explained by the market, 
bj = security j's sensitivity to the market's return,
= the statistical error.
The predicted return for a firm on a day in the event period is the return 
predicted by the market model on that day using the estimates of a,- and bj from the pre- 
event estimation period. That is, the predicted return for security j on day t in the event 
window is:
R jt= a, + bjRmt (14)
The prediction error for security j on day t in the event window is then defined
as:
PEjt=Rjt- R,  (15)
The cumulative prediction error for security j over the event window / = tx to t2 is 
calculated as:
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ti
CPEjjti. a) — X  PEjt (16)
t= ti
The share price reaction for the bidding firms that announce a takeover are 
estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error, APE, for all bidders on day t. 
That is,
^  o ’)N /=!
where N is the number of bidders in the sample.
The cumulative average prediction error (CAPE) over an event-window (t= h to 
t2) is the sum of the daily average prediction errors:
CAPE = £  APEt (18)
f=n
The average price reaction to a takeover announcement is the CAPE estimated over the
two-day event window (t= -1, 0 ).
To test whether the CAPE of a sample is significantly different from zero, the test
statistic is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the square root of the product of the
estimation-period variance and the number of days in the CAPE event-window (tj, t2).
The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis that the CAPE is
equal to zero if the APE are independent, identically distributed, and normal.
2.4.I.2. Robustness of measuring excess returns: mean- and market-adjusted 
returns
To examine the sensitivity of the results in this paper to the specifications of the 
above procedure for measuring the announcement excess returns, prediction errors based
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on mean- and market-adjusted returns are also calculated. The use of mean-adjusted 
returns addresses one problem of the standard event-study methodology by avoiding the 
specification of the risk factors of stock returns. The use of market-adjusted returns in 
the event-study controls for a drastic market-wide movement on the announcement date.
2.4.2. Multivariate regression analysis and variable specifications
A weighted-least-squares regression framework is used to test whether the 
reputation of financial intermediaries mitigates the negative signal conveyed by the 
decision to use equity to finance a takeover. The dependent variable is the two-day 
announcement-period cumulative prediction errors for the takeover sample. The 
independent variables include variables relating to certification and monitoring of 
financial intermediaries, and other relevant variables suggested by extant literature. 
Specifically:
CPEi = ao + aiACCi + a2BANKj + ajINV 14 + aJNV^ + ajACCi*STOCKi 
+ a<sBANKi«STOCKi + a7INVu*STOCKc+ aglNV^STOCKi 
+ 89STOCK1 + aioCOMBOi + anMULTi+ auTENDERi 
+ au OWNy + au OWN24 +at5 SIZEi + ai6 RUNUPi 
+ an RUNUP2+ei (19)
where CPEi is the two-day announcement-period cumulative prediction error of firm i 
that announces a takeover.
ACCi takes the value of one if the accounting firm employed by the bidder is one 
of the Big Six accounting firms, and zero otherwise. Following Dopuch and Simunic 
(1982) and Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), the following auditors are identified as
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Big Six accounting firms: Arthur Andeson, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst and Young, KPMG Marwick, and Price Waterhouse. (Prior to the merger "wave” 
among accounting firms in the late 1980s, the Big Eight are generally considered as the 
high-quality accounting firms: Arthur Anderson, Peat Marwick, Arthur Young, Ernst 
and Whinney, Touche Ross, Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand, and Deloitte, 
Haskins, and Sells.) Dopuch and Simunic argue that the accounting firms above have 
higher credibility than other accounting firms because auditor’s reputation is more 
important than the procedure in the auditing process.
Following Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), BANK, is the ‘debt in current 
liabilities’ minus long-term ‘debt due in one year’ (both obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT database) scaled by the sum of the book value of debt and the market 
value of equity. Long-term debt due in one year is subtracted to focus on the periodic 
and short-term nature of bank loans. Although debt in current liabilities includes 
liabilities due non-banks, the short-term nature of these liabilities is consistent with 
Fama's (1985) argument about short-term of bank loans. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson 
(1990) provide a detailed discussion about the appropriateness of this variable.
INVij takes a value of one if the investment bank employed by the bidder in a 
takeover is prestigious, and zero otherwise. Following Bowers and Miller (1990) and 
Servaes and Zenner (1996), five investment banks in acquisitions are classified as 
prestigious (or first-tier): First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
and Salomon Brothers. This classification rule is largely based on Hayes’ (1979) 
discussion that a small set of investment banks dominate the industry. Ideally, to test
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whether the results are robust with respect to specification of high-quality investment 
banks, a continuous variable based on the underwriting revenues of investment banks 
should be used in a separate test Two difficulties emerge. First Investment Dealer s’ 
Digest publishes data of related underwriting revenues only for the fifteen top investment 
banks each year. Second, even if such data were available for each investment bank, 
there are more than six categories of related underwriting revenues: revenues based on 
common stock offerings with a foil credit to lead investment banks only, common stock 
offerings with a full credit to all participating investment banks, common stock offerings 
disaggregated by whether foreign offerings or closed-end funds are excluded, initial 
public offerings, etc. So for, there is no widely accepted practice as to which category 
should be used to rank investment banks.
INV24 takes a value of 1 if the identity of investment bank in a takeover is not 
disclosed by the bidder, and 0 otherwise. Excluding offers where the identity of bidders' 
investment banks is not disclosed would significantly reduce the number of observations 
on bidders' accounting firms and commercial banks.
STOCK, equals 1 if the offer is a stock offer at the announcement; and 0  
otherwise.
COMBO; takes a value of 1 for a offer that is funded through a combination of 
stock and cash (including debentures); and 0 otherwise. This variable is included to 
control for the presence of combination offers in the sample. To preserve a large sample 
size, this study does not exclude the offers funded through a combination of stock and 
cash. Travlos (1987) uses a similar approach. Alternatively, one could eliminate all the
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combination offers from the sample. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) use that 
approach to examine how the bidder's managerial ownership relates to the medium of 
exchange in takeovers.
MULTi takes the value of one if there is a knowledge that a takeover involves 
multiple bidders at the announcement, and zero otherwise. This variable is included 
because Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Niden (1993) find that the competition 
among bidders tends to decrease the announcement returns to bidders but increase the 
returns to targets. The observations are based on the first bid of the ultimately successful 
bidder. MULTi, therefore, captures the downward bias this selection procedure imposes 
on the bidder's announcement returns.
TENDER, is equal to 1 for a tender offer; and 0 otherwise. Announcements are 
checked against all 14D-1 forms compiled by the Lexis/Nexis Lie. to identify a tender 
offer. This variable is included because Huang and Walkling (1987) report that tender 
offers tend to be cash offers. Since this study contrasts cash offers with stock offers, it is 
possible that any difference between cash offers and stock offers is a result of acquisition 
type (i.e. tender offer or merger) rather than a result of the form of payment.
Ownership variables OWN^and OWN^take the form of binary variables rather 
than continuous variables because (1) Stulz’s (1988) model suggests a non-linear effect 
of the target’s managerial ownership on the takeover premium and probability of the 
success of a bid and (2) Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) report a non-linear relation 
between the firm's managerial ownership and the firm's value. In Stulz's theory, 
strengthening managerial control of the firm at the low and high managerial ownership
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levels increases the value of the firm, while such a strengthening at the middle managerial 
ownership level leads to a decrease in the value of the firm. Based on Amihud, Lev, and 
Travlos’ (1990) finding that negative bidders’ excess returns for takeovers funded 
through stock are mainly concentrated in bidders with a low managerial ownership (less 
than 5 percent of bidder's number o f shares outstanding), OWNy takes the value of one 
if the bidder’s directors and officers as a group own less than 5 percent of their firm’s 
shares prior to the takeover announcement, and zero otherwise. In addition, OWNy 
takes the value of one if the bidder's managerial ownership exceeds 25 percent prior to 
the announcement; and zero otherwise. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) report that 
their results (as above) are not sensitive to the specification of managerial ownership 
(e.g. ownership by top two, top five managers, or all directors and managers).
SIZEi is the logarithm of the market value of the bidder’s equity at the end of the 
year prior to the takeover announcement Theoretical models (Fama, 1985, and 
Diamond, 1991) and empirical evidence (Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock, 1992) argue 
that firm size is likely to be positively related to the public information available about 
the firm in the market.
RUNUPiis the price run-up of the bidder's stock over the 49-day (days -50 to - 
2 ) pre-announcement period, while RUNUP2 is the price run-up in the CRSP equally- 
weighted index returns over the 49-day pre-announcement period. RUNUPi is included 
in the analysis because security issuance literature, such as Masulis and Korwar (1986), 
and Asquith and Mullins (1986), finds that firms tend to conduct seasoned equity 
offerings subsequent to a period in which the issuers' stock prices rise. RUNUP2 is
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included because some studies on security issuance, such as Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
find that seasoned equity issuance is made following an increase in the general level of 
stock prices. The above 48-day pre-announcement period is defined as days -SO to -2 
because (1) the time period used to estimate market-model parameters is days -250 to - 
51 (where day 0  represents an event's announcement date) and (2 ) the cumulative 
prediction errors for an announcement are estimated from days -1  to 0 .
It is necessary to include interaction terms in the regression analysis above to 
compare benefits of external monitoring in stock offers to those in cash offers. The 
interpretation of coefficient estimates of these interaction terms is provided in section
2.6.3.
The Goldfeld-Quandt test is employed to test for heteroscedasticity in the 
multivariate regression analysis. The rationale and procedure of Goldfeld-Quandt test 
are discussed in the Appendix.
2.5. Date
The initial sample consists of acquisitions announced during the period January 
1989 through December 1995 as reported in the Mergerstat Review. The identity of the 
accounting firm for a company is obtained from Compact Disclosure. The bank loan (as 
defined in section 2.4.2) data come from the COMPUSTAT database. The identity of the 
investment bank involved in a takeover is obtained from the Watt Street Journal and 
Mergers and Acquisitions. The announcement date of a proposed bid is the initial date 
of the first public announcement of the offer in the Wall Street Journal Index or the filing 
date of the first 14D-1 form (for a tender offer), whichever is earlier. Following
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Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) and Travlos (1987), only successful bids are included 
in the sample of this study. Travlos (1987) compares unsuccessful bids with successful 
ones, and find that results on unsuccessful bids are qualitatively similar to those on 
successful ones. The method of payment is the initial method of payment announced in 
a bid. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) report that there are few changes between 
initially announced payment method and the actual payment method. The payment 
method is first obtained from the Mergerstat Review, and then checked against the Wall 
Street Journal. If there is a discrepancy between the payment methods for an offer 
reported by Mergerstat Review and the Wall Street Journal, the stories for that offer in 
the Wall Street Journal are examined to determine the initial method of payment. An 
offer is a tender offer if the search of the Lexis/Nexis database indicates that the bidder 
for that offer submits a 14D-1 form. The information of whether an offer involves 
multiple bidders at the announcement is obtained from the Wall Street Journal. All 
returns, such as announcement returns and the price run-ups over the pre-announcement 
period, are from the CRSP database.
For the acquisitions to be included in the sample, they must meet the following
criteria:
First, the acquiring firm must have return data on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) tapes over the period 250 days prior to through 51 days after the 
announcement date so that the market reaction to a takeover announcement can be 
assessed.
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Second, utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial companies (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) are excluded. Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar 
(1986) argue that the nature of information, if any, revealed by equity offerings of these 
firms differs from that of industrial firms. These researchers suggest that regulation of 
these firms implies a less severe problem of asymmetric information.
Third, the acquirers must end up with obtaining more than 50% of the common 
shares of the targets. Acquisitions resulting in less than 50% ownership are excluded 
from the sample. Both friendly and hostile acquisitions are included in the analysis.
Fourth, no confounding corporate events to the bidding firm (such as dividends 
or earnings announcements) occur during the period two days before through one day 
after the announcement date of a proposed bid.
Fifth, the target's shares must be publicly traded. This requirement is imposed 
because the motive of a private target firm to accept a stock offer may differ from that of 
public target company, such as liquidity considerations.
2.6. Empirical Results
2.6.1. Distribution of the sample
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics. The full sample consists o f324 takeover 
announcements over the period January 1989 through December 1995. The distribution 
of announcements disaggregated by medium of exchange and year is reported in panel A. 
For the full sample, a relatively large number of the takeovers, 158 out o f324 (or 48.77 
percent), use stock as the medium of exchange. Ninety six acquisitions (or 29.63 
percent) are financed by cash or debentures. Seventy takeovers (or 21.60 percent) are
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Table 2.1
Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the period January 1989 through December 199S.
Full sample contains 324 takeover announcements. Restricted sample contains 94 
announcements, where all the accounting firms, investment banks, and commercial banking 
relationship of the bidders are known. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial 
companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. Combination offers are those 
funded through a combination of cash and stock. Cash offers include those financed by cash and 
debenture. ACC takes the value of one if the bidder uses a Big-Six accounting firm. INVi 
equals one if the bidder employs a first-tier investment bank and zero otherwise. INV2 equals one 
if the identity of bidder's investment bank is not disclosed and zero otherwise. TENDER takes 
the value of one for a tender offer and zero otherwise. MULT is equal to one if there are more 
than one bidders at the takeover announcement and zero otherwise. OWNi takes the value of one 
if ownership by officers and directors as a group is lower than 5 percent and zero otherwise. 
OWN2 equals one if ownership by officers and directors exceeds 25 percent and zero otherwise.
Panel A: Number o f announcements by medium o f exchange and year: fu ll sample
Year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
Cash 32 9 3 5 9 18 20 96
Payment Combination 5 7 12 13 12 7 14 70
method Stock 16 22 29 11 18 29 33 158
Total 53 38 44 29 39 54 67 324
Panel B: Characteristics o f takeover announcements: fu ll sample
Descriptive measure Mean Median Min. Max.
Market value of the bidder's equity, millions 4,663 1,187 9 87,193
Purchase price for the target, millions 826 176 10 19,000
Purchase price /  market value of bidder's equity 0.57 0.23 0 .0 0 1 11.04
Bidder's book value o f debt/ market value of equity 2 .0 0 0.46 0 .0 1 9.23
Bank loan /  (book value of debt + market value of
equity) 0.030 0 .0 0 1 0 0.65
Equity ownership by bidder's officers and director
as a group 0 .1 2 0.05 0 .0 0 0 1 0.71
(table con'd)
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Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the sample period January 1989 through December 1995.
Panel C: Counts o f indicator variables with the value o f one: fu ll sample
Indicator variable Number of the counts % of the full sample
ACC= 1 313 96.60
INV!= 1 52 16.05
INV2= 1 227 70.06
TENDER=1 63 19.44
MLJLT= 1 23 7.10
OW N!=l 176 54.32
o w n 2= 1 46 14.20
Panel D: Number ofannouncements by medium o f exchange and year: 
restricted sample (94 announcements)
Year
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
Cash 7 1 1 2 1 6 8 26
Payment Combination 1 1 1 5 4 4 7 23
method Stock 4 4 11 1 10 11 4 45
Total 1 2 6 13 8 15 2 1 19 94
(table con'd)
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Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the sample period January 1989 through December 1995.
Panel E: Characteristics o f takeover announcements: restricted sample (94 
announcements)
Descriptive measure Mean Median Min. Max.
Market value of the bidder's equity, millions 7,489 2,428 113 68,116
Purchase price for the target, millions 2,279 1 ,0 2 1  75 19,000
Purchase price /  market value of bidder's equity 0.91 0.46 0.013 2.80
Bidder’s book value of debt /  market value of equity 1.52 0.51 0.01 9.65
Bank loan /  (book value of debt + market value of
equity) 0.033 0.008 0 0.56
Equity ownership by bidder's officers and director
as a group 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.70
Panel F: Counts o f indicator variables with the value o f one: 
restricted sample (94 announcements)
Indicator variable Number of the counts % of the restricted sample
ACC =  1 90 95.74
INV i= 1 52 55.32
TENDER= 1 26 27.66
M ULT=1 9 9.57
OW Ni= 1 59 62.77
OWN2= l 12 12.77
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funded through a combination of stock and cash. The sampling criteria selects one to 
three percent of all mergers and acquisitions appearing 'mMergerstat Review. Because 
the sample represents large transactions with more complete information available for 
bidders, targets, and offers, the results are not generalizable to all mergers and 
acquisitions. The selected transactions, however, are likely to be those of greater 
economic importance. The sample is also comparable to those drawn in previous studies 
of takeovers.
The mean values o f characteristics of the bidders are reported in panel B. The 
mean size of the bidder's market capitalization is $4,663 million and the median value is 
$1,187 million. The mean value of the transaction price divided by the market value of 
the bidder's equity is 0.57, while the median value is 0.23. The maximum value of the 
ratio of the transaction price to the market value of the bidder's equity is 11.04 (Le., 
Columbia Healthcare Corp.'s acquisition of HCA Healthcare Corp. on October 4,1993). 
The mean ratio of bidders' bank loan (defined in section 2.4.2) as a percentage of the 
sum of its book value of total debt and market value of equity is 0.030; the median value 
is 0.001. The mean ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity is 2.00; the 
median value is 0.46. The mean value of equity ownership by bidders' officers and 
directors as a group is 0.12, while the median value is 0.05.
Panel C of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on dummy variables used in 
the regression analysis. Most ofthe bidders (313 out o f324) in the sample use Big Six 
accounting firms. Fifty-two bidders use at least one of the first-tier investment banks: 
First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers.
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Forty-five bidders use non-first-tier investment banks or do not use any investment banks 
at all. A search o f the Wall Street Journal and Mergers and Acquisitions finds that the 
rest of the bidders in the sample do not disclose whether or not they use any investment 
banks. Approximately 19 percent o f the takeover announcements are tender offers. 
Twenty-three o f324 takeovers in the sample involve more than one bidder at the initial 
announcement. Most of the bidders in the sample (54.32 %) have a managerial 
ownership below 5 %; while only 14.20 % of bidders have a managerial ownership above 
25 %. The managerial ownership is measured by the percentage of common shares 
owned by officers and directors as a group.
Panels D, E, and F of Table 2.1 report the characteristics of the restricted sample, 
which contains 94 takeover announcements where all the investment banks, accounting 
firms, and commercial banking relationships for the targets are known. As discussed in 
section 2.4.2, to preserve a sufficient sample size, both the full sample (324 
announcements) and the restricted sample (94 announcements) are analyzed to test the 
theory of financial intermediation in takeovers. The results, discussed in section 2.6.4, 
indicate that the conclusions on external monitoring in takeovers are qualitatively similar 
in both samples.
2.6.2. Regression results disaggregated by the medium of exchange
Table 2.2 reports Pearson correlation coefficient estimates for the variables used 
in the empirical tests. The results reveal that tender offers tend to be associated with the 
use of cash as the form of payment. The correlation coefficient between STOCK and 
TENDER is significantly negative at the 1 percent level. TENDER and COMBO are
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Table 2.2 Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for 324 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December 199S
BANK is calculated as "debt in current liabilities" minus "debt due in one year" scaled by the sum of debt's book value and equity's market value. ACC takes a 
value of 1 if the bidder uses a Big Six auditor, and 0 otherwise. INVi equals 1 if the bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover, and 0 
otherwise. INV2 is equal to 1 if the identity of the investment bank involved in a takeover on the bidder's side is not disclosed; and 0 otherwise. STOCK 
equals 1 for a stock ofTer, and 0 otherwise. COMBO equals 1 for a combination offer, and 0 otherwise. TENDER equals 1 if the offer is a tender offer; and 0 
otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 if the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWNi equals 1 if ownership by bidder's 
officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 otherwise. OWN2 equals 1 if ownership by bidder's officers and directors exceeds 25 %; and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of bidder's equity, /^values are in parentheses.
MULT STOCK COMBO OWN, ow n2 SIZE BANK INV, INVj ACC
TENDER 0.08 -0.44*” -0 .12** 0 .11* -0.04 0.13** -0 .02 0,08 -0.14” -0,00 TENDR
(0.17) (0 .0 0 ) (0 .02) (0.06) (0.44) (0 .02) (0 .68) (0.16) (0 .01) (0.96)
MULT -0.17*** 0 .10* 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.08 0.05 MULT
(0 .0 0) (0.07) (0.83) (0.87) (0.29) (0.32) (0.47) (0.14) (0.38)
STOCK -0.53*** -0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0 .12** 0.03 0.01 -0.01 STOCK
(0 .00) (0.17) (0.53) (0.63) (0,03) (0.62) (0.92) (0.89)
COMBO -0,05 0 .00 -0,04 O.U* 0.01 -0 .02 0 06 COMB
(0,39) (0.94) (0.46) (0.05) (0.84) (0.72) (0.31)
OWN, -0.44*** 0.39**’ 0 .11* 0.05 -0 .11” -0,06 OWN,
(0 .0 0 ) (0 .00) (0.05) (0.33) (0.04) (0.31)
OWN2 -0.31***
(0 .00)
0.01
(0 .86)
-0.04
(0.51)
0,03
(0.54)
0.02 OWN2 
(0.70)
SIZE 0.07
(0 .22)
0 .22***
(0 .00)
-0.31***
(0 .00)
0.09* SIZE 
(0.09)
BANK 0,08
(0.15)
-0 .02
(0.77)
0.04 BANK 
(0.49)
INV, -0 .6 8***
(0 .0 0)
0.03 INV, 
(0.58)
INV2 0.04 INV2 
(0.48)
(table con'd)
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Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for 324 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December 199S
BANK is calculated as "debt in current liabilities" minus "debt due in one year" scaled by the sum of debt's book value and equity's market value, ACC takes a 
value of 1 if the bidder uses a Big Six auditor, and 0 otherwise, INV] equals 1 if the bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover; and 0 
otherwise. IN V2 is equal to 1 if the identity of the investment bank involved in a takeover on the bidder's side is not disclosed; and 0 otherwise, STOCK 
equals 1 for a stock offer, and 0 otherwise, COMBO equals 1 for a combination offer, and 0 otherwise, TENDER equals 1 if the offer is a tender offer, and 0 
otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 if the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWN) equals 1 if ownership by bidder's 
officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 otherwise. OWN2 equals 1 if ownership by bidder’s officers and directors exceeds 23 %; and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE is the logarithm ofthe market value of bidder's equity, p-values are in parentheses.
TENDER MULT STOCK COMBO OWN, OWNj SIZE BANK INV, INVz
RUNUP, -0.10* -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.08 -0,05 0.04
(0.08) (0.90) (0.26) (0.51) (0.22) (0.89) (0.49) (0.15) (0.40) (0.52)
RUNUPj -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.06 -0,00 0.00 0.09* -0.08 0.00 0.02
(0.68) (0.97) (0.63) (0.28) (0.98) (0.89) (0.09) (0.17) (0.89) (0.68)
ACC RUNUP2
RUNUP, 0.08 0.18***
(0.18) (0.00)
RUNUPj 0.03
(0.60)
*, **, and indicate statistical significance at the 10, S, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
Ul
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also negatively correlated at the 5 percent level. In addition, SIZE is positively 
correlated with the use o f two high-quality intermediaries: first-tier investment banks 
(INVi) and Big-Six accounting firms (ACC). This suggests that large firms tend to use 
prestigious investment banks and auditors. SIZE, however, is not significantly correlated 
with BANK. The payment method variables (STOCK and COMBO) are generally not 
correlated with two external monitoring variables (INVi, and ACC) at conventional 
levels. This insignificance in correlation alone, however, does not imply that external 
monitors play no role in addressing the information asymmetry problem (as discussed in 
section 2.3.4). The bidder's pre-announcement share price run-up, RUNUPi, and the 
run-up of equally-weighted market returns, RUNUP2, are not correlated with the 
payment method variables.
Results on bidders' two-day announcement excess returns for takeovers 
disaggregated by the medium of exchange are consistent with those reported by previous 
studies (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, Travlos, 1987, and Kaplan and Weisbach,
1992). Table 2.3 indicates a mean value of announcement excess returns for stock offers 
of - 2.09 %, significant at the 1 % level (/-value = -4.91). Approximately seventy 
percent of bidders in stock offers experience negative announcement excess returns 
significant at the I % level based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test ( z  value -  -S.31). The 
median value of bidders' announcement excess returns is - 1.78 percent. The mean 
values of bidders' excess returns for both cash and combination offers are insignificantly 
different from zero at conventional levels (/-values for cash offers and combination offers 
are -0.55 and -0.96, respectively). Wilcoxon signed ranks tests on the proportion of
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Table 2.3
Bidder's two-day announcement cumulative average prediction errors (CAPE) for 348 
takeover announcements over the period January 1989 through December 1995.
Initial takeover announcements come from Mergerstat Review. All announcements are 
checked against the Watt Street Journal. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and 
financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. Combination 
offers are those funded through a combination of cash and stock. Cash offers include 
those financed by cash and debenture. Two-day cumulative average prediction errors 
(CAPEs) are calculated by using standard event-study method as described in Brown and 
Warner (1985). The test statistic on CAPE is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the 
square root o f the product ofthe estimation-period variance and 2 (which is the number 
of days in the event window). Significance test on the proportion of negative two-day 
announcement prediction errors is based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test and reported as z 
value.
Category
Sample
size
Mean
CAPE f-value
%
negative
returns r-value
Median
CAPE
Cash offers 96 -0.24% -0.55 50.00% -0.30 - 0.02 %
Combination offers 70 - 0.64 % -0.96 57.90% -1.26 - 0.62 %
Stock offers 158 -2.09% . •••-4.91 70.32% -5.3 i*~ - 1.78 %
*, " , and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in two tailed tests.
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negative excess returns also provide the same insignificance results for both cash and 
combination offers.
The value o f external monitoring in a multivariate regression framework is 
examined next The dependent variable is the two-day announcement excess returns, 
CPE, for the sample of takeover announcements disaggregated by the medium of 
exchange. Because Goldfeld-Quant test yields a F-value o f 3.15 (significant at the 1 
percent level), coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with the standard 
error of estimation period residuals (obtained from the market model) as the weighting 
factor to adjust for heteroscedasticity in the variances o f stock returns across firms in the 
sample.
Table 2.4 presents the test results for the takeover announcements by the method 
of payment. The specifications of the proxies for external monitoring follow previous 
studies of Servaes and Zenner (1996), Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), and Dopuch 
and Simunic (1982). Details of variable specifications are discussed in section 2.4.2.
Table 2.4 presents the test results. For cash offers, the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients but the intercept are equal to zero cannot be rejected at conventional levels 
(F-value = 1.22). This suggest that none of the independent variables, including external 
monitoring variables and ownership variables, are important factors in explaining bidders' 
announcement excess returns in cash offers. Similarly, test results for combination offers 
indicate that the null hypothesis that all coefficients but the intercept are equal to zero 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels (F-value = 1.15).
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Table 2.4
Estimated coefficients o f regressions of cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover 
announcements made between January 1989 through December 1995
ACC takes a nine of l ifthe bidder uses a Big Six auditor; and 0 otherwise. INVi equals 1 ifthe bidder employs a 
prestigious investment bank m die takeover; and Oathcnrise. INVziseqnalto 1 iftbe identity of the investment 
bank involved m a takeover on the bidder's side is not disclosed; and 0 otherwise. STOCK equals 1 fir a stock 
offer, and 0 otherwise. COMBO takes a value of 1 foa combination offer, and 0 otherwise. TENDER equals 1 if 
the offer is a tender ofier; and 0 otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 ifthere are multiple bidders at the 
announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWNt equals 1 ifequity ownership by bidder's officers and directors as a group is 
below S K; and 0 otherwise. OWN2 equals I ifownersfaip by bidder's officers and directors is larger than 25 %; 
and 0 otherwise. S1/-K is the logarithm of the market value ofbidder's equity. RUNUPi is the bidder's stock price 
run-up over a 49-day per-mnouncemeut period. RUNUP2 is the price run-up of equally-weighted CRSP index over 
a 49^ Jay pre-announcement period. Prestigious investment hank* and Big Six auditors are defined in section 2.4.2. 
BANK is calculated as’debt in current liabilities'minus ’debt dne in one year1 scaled by the sum of debt's book 
value and equity's market value.
Independent
variable Coefif Cash offers Combo offers Stock offers
Intercept bo 4.14 (1-45) -7.80 (-112) -3.75 (-124)
ACC bi -0.20 C-o.ii) 9.98 (1-59) -0.36 (-0.15)
BANK b3 -6.46 (-0.96) -1.15 (-0.21) 13.78 (2.40)“
INVt b3 -1.46 (-1.01) -2.73 (-133) •0.18 (0-13)
INV2 b4 -0.35 (-0.31) 0.92 (0.52) -0.04 (-0.04)
MULT bs 0.89 (0.73) -0.99 (-0.52) -4.90 (-1.85)*
TENDER b6 -1.85 (-2.12)“ 0.46 (0.22) 4.21 (117)
OWN, br -0.78 (-0.74) 2.07 (1.48) 0.47 (0.46)
OWN2 b, 0.23 (0.13) -2.24 (-1.31) 2.78 (2.10)“
SIZE bo -0.27 (-1-10) ■0.51 (1-10) 0.18 (0.58)
RUNUP, bio 0.13 (0.47) 0.33 (0.51) 0.15 (0.67)
RUNUP2 b,i -0.22 (-0.19) 0.79 (-1.76)* -1.07 (-121)
F
R2
Adjusted B?
# of observations
1.22
0.14
0.03
96
1.15
0.17
0.02
70
1.91“
0.13
0.06
158
" , and ”* denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed
tests.
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For stock offers, however, the F-vahie for the test of the hypothesis that all coefficients 
but intercept are equal to zero is 1.91, significant at the 5 percent level. The banking 
relationship variable has a significantly positive coefficient 13.78 at the 5 percent level 
(/-value = 2.40). Thus, investors use the information o f the bidder's banking relationship 
to alter the valuation o f the bidder's shares in stock offers. The high-ownership variable, 
OWN2 (which takes the value of one if bidders' managerial ownership exceeds 25 %; and 
zero otherwise), has a positive coefficient significant at the 5 percent level (/-value = 
2.10). This is consistent with Stulz's (1988) and Amihid, Lev, and Travlos' (1991) 
argument that the market views the financing decisions applied by firms with relatively 
high managerial ownership to be consistent with shareholders' value maximization (since 
managers with relatively high equity ownership act as they are the owners of the firm).
All other coefficients are insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels for 
stock transactions. MULT (capturing the competition effect in a takeover) obtains a 
negative coefficient estimate at the 10 percent level, consistent with the notion that the 
competition in takeovers decreases the returns to bidders.
2 .(3 . Regression results for the entire sample
Unlike in seasoned equity and initial public offerings, bidders' managers in equity- 
financed takeovers are "bound" in that the proceeds are earmarked to purchase the 
targets' assets. Thus, it is necessary to compare the market reactions in the presence of 
high-quality external monitors in stock offers to those in cash offers. Under the 
argument set forth by Myers and Majluf (1984), Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987),
Travlos (1987), and the theoretical analysis in section 2.3.1, the value of external
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monitoring in stock offers should exceed that in cash offers because the information 
signaled by stock offers is less favorable (or more unfavorable) than the information, if 
any, conveyed by cash offers.
The interaction terms (ACOSTOCK, BANK«STOCK, and INV>STOCK) 
capture the benefits of external monitoring in stock offers, compared to those in cash 
offers. To see why, consider four bidders: bidder 7 o f a cash offer and bidder 2 of a 
stock offer use Big-Six accounting firms and first-tier investment banks, and have p  % 
bank debt in their capital structure; bidder 3 o f a cash offer and bidder ¥ of a stock offer 
use non-Big-Six accounting firms and, non-first-tier investment banks, and have q % 
bank debt in their capital structure. The regression equation (Equation 19 in section 
2.4.2) predicts bidder 7's announcement excess return to be a0+ at + (p/100)a2 + a3 + an 
+ ai2+ ... +a!7 (assuming for now that all independent variables are important in 
explaining bidders' excess returns). Bidder 2's announcement excess return is predicted 
to bea0+-a/ +(p/100) a2+a3+as + (p/100)a$+ a7 + a9 + an+ ai2+ ...+  a!7. Similarly, 
bidder 3's and bidder ¥s excess returns are projected to be a0+ (q/lOOfa + an + at2 +
... +a/7andao+(^/100)a2 + (^/100)atf+aff+an +a12 + ... + a/7, respectively. The 
benefits, if any, of external monitoring in cash offers are obtained by subtracting bidder 
3's excess return form bidder 7's excess returns: namely a7 + ((p-q)/100)&2 + a3. The 
benefits of external monitoring in stock offers can be obtained by subtracting bidder ^ s 
excess return form bidder 2's excess returns: namely a7 + ((p-?)/1 0 0 )a2 + a3+ as + ((p- 
<7)/100)a<s+ a7. It then follows that the coefficients of interaction terms (i.e., a3, a6, and 
a7) capture the benefits of external monitoring in stock offers, compared to cash offers.
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Table 2.5
Estimated coefficients of regressions cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover 
announcements made between January 1989 through December 1995.
The coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with the standard error of estimation-period residuals 
as the w eighting factor to adjust for heteroscedasticity. ACC takesa value of 1 ifthe bidder uses a Big Six auditor; 
and 0 otherwise. INVt equals 1 ifthe bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover, and 0 
otherwise. INV2isequalto 1 ifthe identity ofthe investment bank involved in a takeover an the bidder's side is 
not disclosed; and 0 otherwise. STOCK equals 1 for a stock offer; and 0 otherwise. COMBO takes a value of 1 for 
a combination offer; and 0 otherwise. TENDER, equals 1 if the offer is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. MULT 
takes the value of I if there is a knowledge that the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 
otherwise. OWN] equals 1 if equity ownership by bidder's officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 
otherwise. OWN2 equals 1 ifownership by bidder's officers and directors is larger than 25%; and 0 otherwise. 
S lZ F.isaqnal to  th a  logarithm  o f  th e  H A W * f^pitalraation  in  equations S.1 and 5.2; and equals 1 ifth e
bidder's market capitalization is below the median value of all industrial firms on the CRSP tape; and 0 otherwise. 
RUNUPi is the bidder's stock price run-up over a 49-day per-announcement period. RUNUP2 is the price run-up of 
equally-weighted CRSP index over a 49-day pre-announcement period, r-values are in parentheses.
Independent
variable
variable
Coeff. Market model CPE Mean-adjusted CPE Binary size
Intercept a0 0.00 (0.00) -0.01 (-0.00) -0.70 (-0.31)
ACC ai 0.87 (0.42) 0.99 (0-47) 0.61 (029)
BANK a2 -2.06 (-0-51) -1.91 (-0.46) -1.93 (-0.48)
INV, a3 -1.43 (-1-18) -1.24 (-1.00) -1.32 (-1-09)
inv2 a4 0.51 (0.52) 0.36 (0.36) 0.65 (0.67)
ACC«STOCK as -0.99 (-0.32) -0.29 (-0.09) 1.12 (-0.36)
BANKaSTOCK 06 17.53 (2.61)”' 18.47 (2.69)“* 16.91 (2-50)**
INV, •STOCK a7 1.70 (0.93) 1.56 (0.83) 1.56 (0.85)
inv2. stock as -0.56 (-0.38) -0.60 (-0.39) -0.55 (-0.37)
STOCK a9 -1.78 (-0.55) -2.52 (-0.76) -1.67 (-0.52)
COMBO ai0 -0.74 (-0.89) -0.77 (-0.91) -0.77 (-0.93)
MULT an -0.51 (-0.52) -0.36 (-0.36) -0.58 (-0.60)
TENDER an -1.08 (-1.32) -0.99 (-1.18) -1.13 (-1.37)
OWN, an 0.66 (1-03) 0.80 (1-23) 0.53 (0.88)
OWN2 an 1.47 (1.55) 1.67 (172)* 1.62 (1-73)*
SIZE au 0.14 (-0.78) •0.18 (-101) -0.73 (-0.63)
RUNUP, at6 0.15 (-106) 0.18 (123) 0.16 (1-13)
RUNUP2 an -0.71 (-1.12) -0.75 (-116) -0.82 (-129)
F 2.10"* 2.19”* 2.08***
R2 0.10 0.11 0.10
Adjusted B? 0.05 0.06 0.05
# of observations 324 324 324
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in 
two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.5 presents evidence consistent with notion that external monitors, particularly 
commercial banks, generate additional value gains for bidders in stock offers, compared 
to cash offers, hi Table 2.5, with the market model generated CPE as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term STOCK»BANK is 17.53, 
significantly positive at the 1 percent level (with /-values of 2.61). There is no evidence 
of any significant effects of Big Six accounting firms and first-tier investment banks on 
bidders' announcement excess returns in stock offers. The coefficient estimates of 
ACOSTOCK and INV>STOCK variables are insignificantly different from zero at 
conventional levels. Unlike in Table 2.4, the high-ownership variable, OWN2, is no 
longer significant, implying that the managerial ownership effect is sensitive with respect 
to the sample selection (and, possibly, the definition of a "high" managerial ownership). 
Other independent variables are insignificantly different from zero, after controlling for 
the existence of banking relationship and managerial ownership.
Taken together, the results are consistent with the notion that the market uses the 
information of bidders' banking relationships to assess bidders' value in stock offers. The 
results on accounting firms and investment banks are insignificant. Why does the market 
view commercial banks to be more effective monitors than accounting firms and 
investment banks in stock offers ? One explanation is that accounting firms and 
investment banks may not commit as much capital or do not have as great an information 
advantage as do commercial banks. As Fama (1985) argues, bank loans place the 
commercial bank's equity at risk throughout the maturity of the loan, and, commercial 
banks have information access (to the client firms) that other market participants do not
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have. Thus, commercial banks have both incentive and information advantage to 
monitor the client firms.
2.6.4. Other variables and sensitivity tests
Brown and Warner (1985) report that the estimation of excess returns is 
generally insensitive to the models selected. Nevertheless, mean- and market-adjusted 
(using value-weighted CRSP returns as benchmark) returns are also used to calculate 
CPEs for the dependent variable in the regression analysis. The use of mean-adjusted 
returns avoids the specification of risk factors of stock returns. The use of market- 
adjusted returns takes into account potential drastic market-wide price movements at the 
announcement dates. Table 2.5 also reports the regression results using two-day mean- 
adjusted returns to generate CPEs. The findings on external monitoring are similar to 
those using the market model CPE as the dependent variable. Only BANK* STOCK and 
0WN2 have estimated coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level 
or better. Similarly, the regression results using the market-adjusted returns to calculate 
CPEs (not reported here) indicate that only BANK*STOCK and OWN2 exhibit 
estimated coefficients significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
BANK*STOCK obtains a coefficient estimate of 17.79 and a /-value of 2.65, significant 
at the 1 percent level, while OWN2 has a coefficient estimate of 1.72 and a /-value 1.81, 
significant at the 10 percent level.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1991) argue that the firm size effect is not linear. 
The firm-size effect arises because relatively large firms tend to use prestigious 
investment banks and Big Six auditors. Fama (1985) and Diamond (1991) argue that the
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benefits of certification and monitoring services provided by intermediaries like 
commercial banks are directly related to borrower size. This is because firm size is 
positively related to the amount of public information about the firm available in the 
market.
To address the firm-size effect, I use a binary variable that takes a value of one if 
the bidder is below the median market value of all industrial firms on the CRSP database; 
and zero otherwise. All industrial firms on the CRSP database, not just the all the firms 
in my sample, are used to eliminate the selection bias of the takeover sample. The results 
are reported in Table 2.5. This variable obtains an insignificant coefficient of -0.73 (t- 
vahie: -0.63). This suggests that the firm-size effect is not an important variable 
explaining bidders' announcement excess returns in takeovers. More importantly, the 
inclusion of this binary variable does not affect the coefficients of the external monitoring 
variables.
The impact of specification of independent variable INV2 (which takes the value 
of one if the identity of bidders' investment bank is not disclosed; and zero otherwise) on 
the regression results is tested. It is likely that the result (in Tables 2.4 and 2.5) that 
bidders' use of first-tier investment banks in stock offers does not affect bidders' 
announcement excess returns is due to the fact that about two-thirds of bidders in the 
entire sample do not disclose the identity of investment banks. To investigate this 
possibility, the regression analysis is conducted on the 94 takeover announcements where 
the identities of all three intermediaries (i.e. accounting firms, commercial banks, and 
investment banks) are disclosed.
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Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of this restricted sample. A comparison 
of these 94 announcements to the full sample (324 announcements) reveals that the 
bidders in the restricted sample are generally larger firms, have a lower managerial 
ownership, involve more competition, and are more likely to be tender offers. However, 
the distribution ofthe methods of payment is similar for both the full and restricted 
samples.
Table 2.6 presents the test results for the restricted sample. Consistent with the 
results for the full sample, Table 2.6 indicates that the market uses the information of 
bidders' banking relationship to re-assess bidders' value in stock offers. The evidence on 
external monitoring provided by auditors and investment banks are still insignificant. 
Specifically, the coefficient of interaction term of banking relationship and stock (i.e., 
BANK»STOCK) is positive at the 5 percent level, with a point estimate o f35.78. 
Coefficient estimates of interaction terms ACC»STOCK and INVi*STOCK remain 
insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels. The high-ownership variable 
(which equals one if bidders' managerial ownership is larger than 25 %; and zero 
otherwise) has a coefficient estimate insignificantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. TENDER (for a tender offer), however, obtains a negative coefficient estimate at 
the 10 percent leveL It is premature to make a conclusion simply based on this 
significant result on TENDER since TENDER is insignificant in the tests of the full 
sample. The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2.6 use bidders' mean-adjusted returns as 
the dependent variable; while the seventh and eighth columns use a binary variable to 
capture bidders' size (namely, the binary variable takes the value of one if bidders' equity
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Table 2.6
Estimated coefficients of regressions cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover 
announcements where all the identities of accounting firms, investment banks, and 
commercial banks are known.
The coefficients ire csrtm»t«d using weighted least squares with the standard error of estimation-period residuals 
as the weighting factor to adjust far hetooacedasticity. ACC takes a value of I if the bidder uses a Big Six auditor, 
and 0 otherwise. INVi equals 1 if the bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover; and 0 
otherwise. STOCK equals 1 for a stock offer; and 0 otherwise. COMBOtakesa value of 1 far a combination offer, 
and 0 otherwise. TENDER equals 1 ifthe offer is a tender offer, and 0 otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 if 
there is a knowledge that the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWNi equals 
1 if equity ownership by bidder's officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 otherwise. OWN2 equals 1 if 
ownership by bidder's officers and directors is larger than 25 %; and 0 otherwise. SIZE is equal to the logarithm of 
the bidder's market capitalization in equations 5.1 and 5.2; and equals 1 if the bidder's market capitalization is 
below the median value of all industrial firms on the CRSP per-announcement period. RUNUPz is the price run-up 
of equally-weighted CRSP index over a 49-day pre-announcement period. Prestigious investment banks are First 
Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers. BANK is calculated as 'debt in 
current liabilities' minus 'debt due in one year1 scaled by the sum of debt's book value and equity's market value.
Big Six auditors are Arthur Anderson, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG Marwick, 
and Price and Waterhouse, r-values are in parentheses.
Independent
variable
variable
Coeff. Market model CPE Mean-adjusted CPE Binary size
Intercept a0 5J3 (0.91) 6.63 (1-10) -0.27 (-0.05)
ACC at 0.57 (0.11) 0.50 (0.09) 2.44 (0.41)
BANK a2 -14.71 (-1-17) -19.93 (-154) -18.06 (-1.35)
INVj a$ -0.73 (-0.49) -0.42 (-0.27) -1.13 (-0.75)
ACC*STOCK a4 -1.59 (-0-16) 2.00 (0.27) -3.94 (-0.50)
BANK-STOCK as 35.78 (2.14)" 39.25 (2.27)** 41.94 (2.34)*"
INVj*STOCK a6 1.19 (0.54) 1.08 (0.48) 1.22 (0.56)
STOCK ai -5.00 (-0.67) -8.62 (-1-13) -2.12 (-0.27)
COMBO at -3.49 (-1.63) -3.88 (-1.75) -3.29 (-1.58)
MULT a. -1.42 (-0-74) -0.95 (-0.48) -1.18 (-0.61)
TENDER a 10 -4.18 (-195)* -4.48 (-2.03)* -4.47 (-2.03)*
OWN, an 2.54 (163) 3.12 (194) 1.90 (131)
OWN2 at3 1.04 (0-48) 1.44 (0.64) 1.50 (0.69)
SIZE at3 -OJl (-1.14) -0.67 (-1.44) 4.17 (1-25)
RUNUP, at4 0.12 (0.31) 0.15 (0-37) 0.08 (0.20)
RUNUP2 an -1.73 (-0.95) -1.95 (-1.04) -1.49 (-0.82)
F 1.65* 1.71* 1.67*
R2 0.24 0.25 0.24
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
# of observations 94 94 94
’, ”, and denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests.
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value is lower than the median value of all industrial firms on the CRSP database, and 
zero otherwise). The results indicate that the conclusions about auditor, banking 
relationship, and investment banks remains the same as in Table 2.5 with respect to 
specifications of bidders' announcement excess returns, equity size, and variables 
pertaining to studies of seasoned equity offerings (such as bidders' stock price run-up 
and price run-up of equally-weighted CRSP index returns over the pre-announcement 
period).
Table 2.6 can be interpreted with the following example to illustrate the value 
generated by bidders' commercial banking relationship in stock offers. Consider two 
bidders in stock takeovers: bidder /  with a 4 % bank debt (which is approximately at the 
bottom of the highest quartfle among all bidders in the sample) in its capital structure, 
and bidder 2 with a zero bank debt. Further assume that the choice of auditor quality, 
the choice of investment bank quality, and the managerial ownership are the same for 
two bidders. The third and fourth columns of Table 2.6 indicate that the share price 
reaction to bidder l's  stock offer announcement would be 1.43 (= 0.04 • 35.78) 
percentage points higher than that to bidder 2's stock offer announcement.
Finally, because over 96 percent of the sample employed a "Big Six” accounting 
firm, ACC effectively becomes the intercept To check for effects of this specification, 
the regressions in Table 2.5 were estimated without ACC. The results are similar with 
the exception that the estimate of coefficient on STOCK becomes significant at the 10 
percent level (coefficient = -2.70, f =-1.80 for the market model CPE regression). This
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finding is consistent with prior finding that announcement effects for bidders in stock 
transactions are smaller than those for cash or combination offers. The details are not 
presented here. Similar results are obtained for the regressions in Table 2.6 where ACC 
is omitted.
2.7. Conclusions
Previous studies have provided two major theories to explain the choice of 
medium of exchange in takeovers: tax considerations, and private information revealed 
by announcements of equity-financed takeovers. In this paper, Titman and Trueman's
(1986) model of entrepreneurs' choice of intermediary quality in new shares offerings is 
modified to analyze how the choice of financial intermediaries that monitor the firm 
conveys private information possessed by corporate insiders in a takeover. Next, 
empirical tests determine whether the financial market uses the information about a 
bidder's choice of investment bank, accounting firm, and commercial banking relationship 
to assess the private information possessed by the bidder's managers in a stock offer.
The results on commercial banks are consistent with the theory of financial 
intermediation, hi stock offers, the share price reactions are positively related to bidders' 
commercial banking relationship. Further, o f all takeover announcements in the sample, 
the external monitoring generated by bidders' commercial banking relationship in stock 
offers generates higher value gains to the bidders, relative to those for cash offers. 
Evidence that the choice of high-quality accounting firms and first-tier investment banks 
alters the market reactions to announcements of stock offers is not found. Thus, the 
results presented in this paper suggest that commercial banks are effective external
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monitors and serve to reveal the private information possessed by corporate insiders 
about the prospects of the firm.
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Chapter 3
Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Takeover Targets and Medium of Exchange
3.1. Introduction
Theories which employ informational asymmetry to explain why managers of 
bidding firms choose equity or cash as the medium of exchange in takeovers differ from 
one another in the focus of that asymmetry: (1) the value o f the bidding firm's shares, (2) 
the value of any synergy, and (3) the value of the target firm's shares. Although there is 
plenty of empirical evidence on the first two theories (see Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 
1987, Travlos, 1987, and Huang and Walkling, 1987, for the first theory, and Kaplan and 
Weisbach, 1992, for the second one), empirical evidence on the third theory is relatively 
scarce.
The objective of this paper is to offer new evidence on whether the medium of 
exchange in takeovers conveys information about the value of target firms. Previous 
literature has examined the stock returns of the targets in takeover bids (e.g., Wansley, 
Lane, and Yang, 1983, and Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson, 1994). This stock-retum 
approach, however, is difficult to interpret since it combines any information effects of 
the medium of exchange with the tax effects associated with the medium of exchange. A 
tax effect results from the fret that gains to shareholders of the targets in cash 
transactions are immediately taxable, while gains to shareholders of the targets in stock- 
financed takeovers are deferred until the new shares are sold (see Wansley, Lane, and 
Yang, 1983, and Huang and Walkling, 1987). This study avoids the tax effect by
61
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examining whether analyst earnings forecast revisions for target firms depend on the 
payment method in takeover bids. The major hypothesis tested is that an announcement 
o f using cash to finance a takeover conveys favorable information about the value of the 
target firm, while the use o f equity as the payment method signals relatively unfavorable 
information.
In contrast to a similar prior study (Brous and Kini, 1993), this study finds that 
financial analysts do not unambiguously revise upward their earnings forecasts for the 
target firms in takeover attempts. Specifically, the results in this study indicate that, for 
all tender offers in the sample, analysts significantly raise their earnings forecasts for the 
current forecast-year for the target firms at the month following the initial takeover 
announcement, but not for the following forecast-year. The present study and the study 
by Brous and Kini differ by time period studied. The difference in time is significant in 
that during earlier period cash dominated these transactions, while stock is the dominant 
medium of exchange during the more recent period. This suggests that the difference in 
results is likely to be time dependent.
This study also finds that unexpected earnings forecast revisions for the targets in 
cash tender offers do not significantly differ from those in tender offers that are financed 
in part by stock. This result holds regardless of whether revised earnings forecasts are 
for the current forecast-year or the following forecast-year. This suggests that the 
market does not perceive the choice of payment method in takeovers to convey 
information about the target's value.
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The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related 
theories and empirical evidence. Section 3.3 discusses the foundation of the empirical 
analysis used in this study. Section 3.4 sets out major hypotheses. Section 3.5 describes 
method of analysis. Empirical results are provided in section 3.6. Section 3.6 concludes 
this chapter.
3.2. Related models and empirical evidence
Myers and Majluf (1984) focus on the information asymmetry between the firms' 
managers and outside investors over the value of the firms' shares. Myers and Majluf 
argue that the market believes that managers will not issue common shares unless they 
view the shares of their firms to be overvalued in the market Thus, in a takeover, the 
market would interpret the use of bidder's stock as payment method as unfavorable 
information, while the use o f cash as favorable information about the bidders' value.
Empirical evidence provided by Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987), and Travlos
(1987) is consistent with Myers and Majlufs (1984) argument on payment method in 
takeovers. Specifically, Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) find that the announcement 
excess returns to stockholders of the bidder are significantly positive for cash bids but 
significantly negative for bids financed by securities. In addition, Travlos (1987) finds 
that irrespective of acquisition type (i.e., mergers or tender offers), cash offers are 
associated with significantly positive announcement-period excess returns to bidders, 
while equity-financed bids are associated with significantly negative excess returns to 
bidders. Furthermore, nonconvertible bonds issued by bidders involved in equity- 
financed takeovers experience significantly negative excess returns at the takeover
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announcement, while those issued by bidders in cash offers experience slightly positive 
excess returns. Taken together, the evidence is supportive of the notion that the market 
views a cash offer as good news and a stock offer as bad news about the bidders' value.
Fishman (1987) assumes that both the bidder and the target have private 
information about the valuation ofthe target (operated as part ofthe bidder). He also 
assumes that costs of collecting information about the valuation for the target are 
nontrivial, and a takeover offer will bring forth potential competition for the target.
Under these settings, when the bidder has information that the target has a relatively high 
valuation, the bidder will use cash to acquire the target and to pre-empt a competing bid. 
When the bidder's information about the valuation for the target is less optimistic, the 
bidder will use equity as the payment method to solicit the private information possessed 
by the target.
Empirical evidence provided by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), however, is 
inconsistent with Fishman's argument (1987). Kaplan and Weisbach find that, ex post, 
the cash acquisitions are just as likely to be poorly performing as the takeovers funded 
through equity.
Hansen (1987) emphasizes the information asymmetry between the target's 
managers and outside investors about the value of the target's assets. In Hansen's theory, 
when the target firm has private information that the acquirer does not have about the 
target's value, for every cash offer that is acceptable (i.e. wealth increasing) to the 
acquirer, there exists a stock offer that dominates that cash offer. That is, the expected 
wealth of the stock offer exceeds that of the cash offer.
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To reconcile his theory with the empirical observation of some cash offers, 
Hansen (1987) introduces into his model the tax effect associated with payment method 
(discussed in section 3.1). In the presence of a tax effect, the optimal choice of payment 
method (cash or stock) faced by the bidder depends on the relative importance of the tax 
effect and private information possessed by the target firm. Another means to reconcile 
Hansen's theory with the existence o f cash offers is to allow the acquirer to have private 
information about the value of its assets. Like the tax effect, the information advantage 
on the bidder's side reduces the importance of information advantage on the target's side, 
and, thus, allows the model to be consistent with the empirical observation of some cash 
offers.
Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994) provide evidence consistent with the notion 
the medium of exchange conveys information about the value of the target firms. They 
examine whether differences in the market's reaction to terminated merger proposals 
depends on the medium of exchange. Examining 123 merger proposal announcements 
over 1980 - 1988 that were subsequently canceled, Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson find 
significantly higher cumulative excess returns for target shareholders after termination of 
cash offers than after termination o f stock offers, even when no subsequent bids follow. 
They interpret this result as supportive of the view that the medium of exchange conveys 
information about the target firms' stand-alone value or its unique synergy potential, 
consistent with Fishman (1987). Further, Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994) do not 
find a revaluation of the bidders' shares after the termination o f merger proposals. It is 
possible, however, that the insignificant difference in the returns for the bidding firms is a
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consequence of the "long-term" nature of the period examined (which starts at the 
announcement date and ends at the termination date).
3.3. Foundation of the analysis
This section discusses two key assumptions underlying the analysis: one, financial 
analysts continue to provide forecasts for target firms as stand-alone entities, and two, 
revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings represent changes in the market's expectations 
about the firm's value.
3.3.1. Do analysts continue to issue forecasts for the firms in takeover bids as 
stand-alone entities ?
This chapter assumes financial analysts continue to provide forecasts for target 
firms as stand-alone entities during takeover bids. Pound (1988) examines retail reports 
from brokerage houses, conducts a survey, and concludes that during takeover bids, 
analysts indeed issue forecasts for target companies as independent entities, rather than 
as a part of bidders. As Pound points out, takeover contests normally result in large 
share price increases for target firms, and thus, create high demand among investors for 
analysts' evaluations of the targets. To meet this high demand and assist investors in 
assessing the fairness of takeover prices offered by bidders, analysts continue to forecast 
stand-alone earnings (and values) for target firms. One example provided by Pound 
(1988, p. 209) is the following:
"In evaluating the fairness ofNestle's 1984 bidfor Carnation, Value 
Line stated: 'The offer is a fa ir one, in our opinion. It is 14.4 times
i ■
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I984's estimated earnings and 12.6 times 1985's—a healthy price fo r a
food company, even one as cash rich and profitable as Carnation.’"
3.3.2. Do revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings reflect changes in the market's 
expectations ?
Several studies suggest that revisions o f analysts' forecasts of earnings impound 
the information relevant to the pricing of the underlying securities. Brown and Rozeflf 
(1978) compare dme-series models with analyst forecasts, and conclude that analyst 
forecasts are superior to time-series models as measures of expectations of earnings. 
Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985) provide an extensive analysis and summarize other 
research on analysts' earnings forecasts. They conclude that there is significant positive 
covariance between analyst forecast revisions and firm-specific excess returns. This 
implies that analysts revise their earnings forecasts in concert with the information that 
affects the value of securities.
Studies of various other financial events have viewed revisions of earnings 
forecasts as indicative of the information content of the event. Among these events are: 
open-market share repurchases (Bartov, 1991, and Hertzel and Jain, 1991), seasoned 
equity offerings (Healy and Palepu, 1990, and Brous, 1992), tender offers (Pound, 1988, 
and Brous and Kini, 1993), dividend policy (Ofer and Siegel, 1987, and Shen, 1994), and 
equity-for-debt swaps (Israel, Ofer, and Seigel, 1989). For example, Brous (1992) 
reports that analysts systematically revise downward earnings forecasts for the firms that 
announce plans to issue seasoned equity. This finding is consistent with the view that 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings convey unfavorable information about the
i
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value of the firm. Pound (1988) and Brous and Kini (1993) examine whether takeover 
bids convey information about the target firms by analyzing analyst forecasts. Neither 
Pound or Brous and Kini examine the medium of exchange in takeovers.
If the bidder and the target have private information about the value o f the target 
(instead o f the value of any synergy), the bidder will use cash to acquire the target when 
the bidder has information indicating a relatively high valuation o f the target. Cash is 
also used to pre-empt competing bids because the use of cash signals a high valuation of 
the target, and the competing bidders' expected payoffs decrease in the initial bidder's 
valuation of the target (Fishman, 1987). (The bidder learns of the value of the target by 
expending resources to collect information about the target's assets.) When the bidder is 
less certain of its information about the value of the target, equity will be offered to 
solicit the information possessed by the target Based on this argument we expect to 
observe revisions of analyst earnings forecasts for target firms in cash takeover bids to 
exceed those in securities-exchange acquisitions. That is, revisions of analysts' forecasts 
of earnings for the target firms in response to announcements of cash takeover bids 
should exceed revisions in response to announcements of equity-financed offers.
3.4. Method of Analysis
3.4.1. Estimating excess earnings forecast revisions
Previous research has identified two statistical properties o f analysts' earnings 
forecasts that are relevant in determining the excess earnings forecast revisions. First, 
O'Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) report that analysts' earnings forecasts are subject to 
an optimism bias. Analysts, on average, tend to overestimate earnings at the early stage
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of the forecast-year and then systematically revise downward their forecasts as time goes 
by. This optimism bias implies that the observed monthly earnings forecast revision (i.e. 
the difference between the mean o f the earnings forecasts for a firm at month t and at 
month t-1) is not zero.
Second, Brous and Kini (1993) observe that approximately 20 percent of the 
analysts following the same firm update their forecasts each month. This implies that any 
information released in a particular month will be impounded in the means of monthly 
analysts' forecast revisions over several subsequent months. Thus, the means of monthly 
forecast revisions should be positively serially correlated. For example, suppose a 
favorable information about the prospects of IBM was released in May, and 20 percent 
of the analysts following IBM update their earnings forecasts at the end of May.
Without losing generality, assume no other information about IBM is released during the 
subsequent four months. Under this scenario, we would expect to observe positive 
earnings forecast revisions at the end of May because of the favorable information. We 
should also expect to observe positive forecast revisions over four subsequent months 
because the remaining 80 percent of the analysts following IBM would impound this 
favorable information into their forecasts over this four-month period. Therefore, in 
general, the serial correlation of the means of monthly forecast revisions is positive.
Brous (1992) provides evidence for the serial correlation of monthly forecast revisions.
Because of these two features of analysts' forecast revisions, a fourth-order 
moving average time-series model is used to estimate unexpected earnings forecast 
revisions. A fourth-order (rather than fifth-order) moving average model capture the
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observation that, on average, 20 percent of the analysts update their forecasts each 
month. In general, if 1/N o f the analysts update their forecasts every month, an (N-l)//r 
order moving average is appropriate to specify the process o f analysts' forecast revisions.
A fourth-order moving-average (MA(4)) model is used instead of an 
autoregressive (AR) model because the autocorrelation of observations in an MA(4) 
model is well consistent with the positive serial correlation o f monthly analyst forecast 
revisions (as discussed above). In contrast, an AR model (i.e., Yt=9Y,.i + ...) does not 
correspond with the process of analyst forecast revisions. An autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) model is not used in the analysis because there is no economic 
theory or evidence on analyst forecast behavior to support the adjustment of'integration' 
(e.g., by applying the operation of yt - yt-i to the entire time-series observations).
Hamilton (1994) provides a detailed discussion about the statistical properties of AR,
MA, and ARIMA models.
The analysis follows Brous and Kini's (1993) procedure for estimating the 
unexpected forecast revisions. The observed (unadjusted) monthly analyst earnings 
forecast revision for firm i  during month t, FRut, is calculated:
FRU = (Fut - Fw )/P w  (20)
where Fut -  mean of analysts' earnings forecasts for firm i  at month t,
Pi.t.i -  price of common stock of firm / at the end of month t-1.
Share price, Pu-u rather than other variables such as actual earnings per share, is used to 
deflate the difference in earnings forecasts in equation (20) for two reasons. First,
Christie (1987) suggests that share price is less correlated with earnings than are other
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variables. Second, Pound (1988) argues that the use of share price as the denominator 
improves the distribution of earnings revisions, relative to normalizing on previous 
earnings or previous forecasts, because earnings series are highly unstable (for example, 
switching from negative to positive earnings for two consecutive quarters or years) and 
seasonal. Brous and Kini (1993) also use the share price to deflate earnings forecasts to 
obtain forecast revisions, as in equation (20).
Because financial analysts are subject to the optimism bias described above, each 
earnings forecast revision is decomposed into forecastable and unforecastable 
components:
FRu = af + yu (21)
where FR^ forecast revision for firm / submitted by individual analyst k  at
month/,
a, = forecastable component of forecast revision for firm i,
yu = unforecastable component of forecast revision. 
yu is not serially correlated because the probability of the arrival of favorable information 
(relating to firm i) is expected to be the same as that of unfavorable information. The 
term yw reflects the information analysts receive or process during the current month t.
Suppose analysts update their earnings forecasts every n months. The 'aggregate' 
forecast revisions for the group of analysts who update their forecasts during month t, 
GFRU, can be expressed as:
it—I
G FRtt- na(+ £  y«-/ (22)
7=0
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The lagged terms of yWv (i.e., yu.h yu.2, ..., Yu-fn-v) are included to reflect the information 
about the firm's prospects that was received or processed by the ^  of analysts over the
preceding n -\ months.
The mean earnings forecast revision for firm / at month /, FR.J, is then:
FRU’ -  -  GFRU= a,+ -  £  Tw (23)n n j=o
hi this study, n is equal to 5 because approximately 20percent of the analysts whose 
earnings forecasts are available on the I/B/E/S database, which is used in this study, are 
assumed to update their forecasts each month (Brous and Kini, 1993).
The expected mean forecast revision at month t for firm /, E(FRU'), is estimated 
by taking the expectation of equation (23). That is:
E ( « 0  = a, + -  X  yw (24)
n  /=  1
The term ya  drops out o f the equation (24) because E(y*.f) is zero [to be technically 
correct, E(yir I time = t) = 0], reflecting the notion that the impact on share prices of 
good news is, on average, the same as that of bad news.
The unexpected forecast revision at month t for firm i, UFRU, can be written as: 
UFRut = F R j  - E (R O  = ru (25)
To obtain the expected forecast revisions, defined by equation (24), the MA(4) 
model is estimated using all months for which earnings forecasts are available, excluding 
event months -6 to +6, consistent with Brous and Kini (1993). The unexpected 
component, yu-j, is measured as the difference between the forecastable component, a„
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and the actual forecast revision in month i. Thus, the expected forecast revision for firm 
/ in month t  equals ah phis the weighted average of the four previous months' unexpected 
component, where the weights are equal to 0.5.
3.4.2. Alignment between event dates and 1/B/E/S earnings forecasts
It is important to incorporate analysts' behavior of updating their earnings 
forecasts in estimating unexpected earnings forecasts. Brown, Foster, and Noreen's 
(1985) survey of analysts' behavior indicates that approximately 85 percent of all 
financial analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to eamings-related 
information within five business days. Thus, seven calendar days are allowed from the 
initial takeover announcement date to the first possible date when I/B/E/S recorded an 
earnings forecast revision related to the takeover announcement. That is, the event 
month zero for forecasts is defined as the thirty-calendar-day window from 7 calendar 
days after to 36 days after the initial announcement date.
3.4.3. Multivariate regression analysis
Multivariate regression framework is used to analyze whether the medium of 
exchange and managerial resistance to a takeover bid convey information about the value 
of target firms. The model is specified as:
UFR/= do + a i METHOD;+ a 2 RESISTS 8/ (26)
where UFR, -  unexpected forecast revision in response to takeover bid
announcement r, as defined by equation (25);
METHODj = 1 for an offer funded through stock or a combination of
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cash and stock; 0 for a cash offer;
RESIST; -  1 if the target's management is opposed to the bid within
30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover 
announcement; and 0 otherwise; 
et — statistical error term.
No interaction term, i.e., METHOD; •RESIST,, is included in equation (26) because 
none of combination offers in my sample are hostile takeovers. The inclusion of this 
interaction term would cause a serious multicollinearity problem in estimating the 
coefficients in equation (26).
The independent variable RESIST; indicates whether the target's managers are 
opposed to the bid over a 30-day period following the initial takeover announcement. 
RESIST; is included in the analysis because Pound (1988) reports that analysts' forecasts 
of earnings fall significantly when the target's management resists the takeover bid. A 
30-day period is chosen to incorporate all effects of resistance on unexpected earnings 
forecast revisions because the dependent variable in the regression is monthly unexpected 
earnings forecast revisions. Table 3.2 indicates that most of the targets in hostile 
takeover attempts (14 out of 17, or 82.35 percent) in the sample disclose the targets' 
attitude toward the bid within 30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover 
announcement.
The test of the hypothesis described in section 3.3 is equivalent to the test of 
coefficients ai. That is, if forecast revisions in cash offers exceed those in stock offers, 
then a ; should be negative.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
3.4.4. "Whisper earnings"
Forecasts of yearly rather than quarterly earnings are used in estimating 
unexpected forecast revisions to minimize the problem associated with the "whisper 
earnings" phenomenon. The following section describes the "whisper earnings” 
phenomenon and discusses the implications. The Wall Street Journal (January 15,1997) 
reports that after the close of a quarter (and before the actual earnings announcement 
date), published earnings forecasts for that quarter no longer represent the market's 
expectations. Instead, the market's "true" expectations on which traders make their buy 
or sell decisions are "whisper earnings", rumors which swirl among traders and 
institutional investors. "Whisper earnings" likely exist because analysts tend to focus on 
the upcoming year, and the close of a quarter typically precedes the actual earnings 
announcement date by a few weeks. Thus, once a quarter is over, analysts rarely update 
their earnings forecasts for that quarter. As an analyst interviewed by the Wall Street 
Journal (January 15, 1997,p . Cl) putit:
"Once a quarter is over, I  never bother changing [earnings] estimates.
  The focus is on the coming year.n
The implications of the [arguable] existence of "whisper earnings" for this study 
are that, in the case where takeover bids are announced surrounding the close of a 
quarter and the actual earnings announcement dates, observations of analysts' earnings 
forecasts are truncated (i.e. some of earnings forecasts are unobservable). These 
unobservable earnings forecasts would have been available had these analysts continued 
to issue forecasts after the close of a quarter. Also, for takeover bids that are announced
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well before the close of a quarter, analyst forecasts should not be subject to the "whisper 
earnings" phenomenon, and, thus, the forecasts for these announcements do not suffer a 
loss of observations (i.e. truncation).
There are at least two possible approaches to minimize the problem associated 
with the "whisper earnings" phenomenon. The first approach, used here because of the 
sample size concern, is to analyze annual rather than quarterly earnings forecasts.
Annual forecasts have fewer truncated observations around the takeover announcement 
dates than do quarterly forecasts because more takeover announcements fall between the 
close of a quarter and the actual earnings announcement date than between the close of a 
fiscal year and the actual earnings announcement date corresponding to that year (since 
the number of quarters exceeds that of years in a fixed time span). Second, takeover 
bids can be disaggregated based on whether they are announced between the close of a 
quarter and the actual earnings announcement date. Test results of these two groups of 
takeover bids are then contrasted to examine whether the results on the entire sample are 
robust to the reported "whisper earnings" phenomenon.
The existence of "whisper earnings", nevertheless, implies that some analyst 
forecasts around the close of a quarter are still not reported by analysts over the 
estimation period used here to estimate the unexpected earnings forecast revisions. The 
second approach is not used because only 10 combination offers and 74 cash offers (all 
of which are tender offers) during January 1988 to December 1995 survive the sample 
selection criteria of this study. Imposing the restrictions of the second approach would 
have resulted in further reduction of the sample size.
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3.5. Data
The initial takeover announcements come from Mergerstat Review and Mergers 
and Acquisitions over the period Jamiaiy 1988 to December 1995. These 
announcements are then checked against all 14D-1 forms compiled by the Lexis/Nexis 
Inc. to identify tender offers. A tender offer is a takeover attempt where the bidder 
bypasses the target firm's board of directors and offers to buy shares directly from target 
firm shareholders. The bidder in a tender offer is required to file a 14D-1 form to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. To be included in the final sample of this study, 
the target firms must meet the following criteria:
First, the bidder must intend to obtain more than 50 percent o f the target's 
common shares outstanding. Partial acquisitions o f 50 percent or fewer of the shares are 
excluded from the sample.
Second, the target's share prices must be available on the CRSP database so that 
analyst earnings forecasts can be normalized by the target's share price, as discussed in 
section 3.5.1.
Third, each target firm must be followed by financial analysts whose earnings 
forecasts are available on the I/B/E/S database.
Fourth, the announcement date is defined as either the first filing date of 14D-1 
forms submitted to the SEC or the initial Wall Street Journal announcement date, 
whichever is earlier.
Fifth, the Wall Street Journal Index is searched to determine whether there are 
subsequent changes in method of payment. Any takeover in which the payment method
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switches either from cash to stock or from stock to cash is excluded from the sample. 
Changes in payment method make it difficult to unambiguously define the payment 
method for the target, particularly when the two different payment methods are 
announced within a 30-day time span (since estimates are of monthly forecast revisions 
in response to a takeover announcement).
Sixth, the information whether the target's management resists a takeover attempt 
comes form the Watt Street Journal Index.
Seventh, the bidder must be a publicly-traded firm so that the bidder can choose 
from cash, stock, and combination of cash and stock as payment method.
3.6. Empirical Results
Tables 3.1 presents the frequency distribution of the tender offers in the final 
sample. Of the 84 tender offers where analysts' forecasts of earnings per share for the 
current forecast-year for the targets are available at the takeover announcement in the 
sample, 74 announcements, or 88.10 percent, take the form of cash as payment method. 
The remaining 10 tender offers, or 11.90 percent, are funded through a combination of 
cash and stock. Surprisingly, no stock offers survive the data selection criteria as 
described in section 3.5. There are two stock tender offers (the target firms: CMX Corp.
and Costar Corp.) appearing over the period January 1988 to December 1995. 
However, revisions of analysts' forecasts o f yearly earnings for CMX Corp. reported by 
the I/B/E/S end at November 30, 1983, nearly five years earlier than the offer 
announcement date November 8, 1988. Revisions of forecasts of earnings for Costar 
Corp. are also unavailable on the I/B/E/S database seven calendar days subsequent to the
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Table 3.1
Frequency distribution o f the sample of tender offers announced over the period January 
1988 to December 199S
The targets of these tender offers are followed by financial analysts whose forecasts are 
available in the I/B/E/S database at the takeover announcements. In addition, the bidders 
must intend to obtain more than SO percent of the targets' common shares outstanding. 
No partial acquisitions are included. The targets' share prices must be available on the 
CRSP database. The bidders are publicly-traded firms.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total
Cash offers 22 6 7 9 5 9 10 6 74
Combination
offers 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 10
Stock offers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 23 6 8 11 7 10 12 7 84
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offer announcement date, making data insufficient to estimate analysts' response to the 
announcement (see section 3.4.2 for why there must be at least seven days allowed from 
the takeover announcement date to the first date when I/B/E/S recorded a forecast 
revision related to the takeover announcement).
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics o f the target firms in the sample. Overall, 
the characteristics (except the target's attitude toward a takeover bid) are similar in cash 
offers and combination offers. During the takeover month (i.e. a month subsequent to a 
tender-oflfer announcement), the mean value of the number of revisions of earnings for a 
target in a cash offer is 3.64, and the median value is 2. For combination offers, the 
mean value of the number of forecast revisions for a target during the takeover month is 
3.8, while the median value is 3. For all months excluding months -6 to +6, the 
difference in the numbers of revisions of earnings for a target in cash offers and in 
combination offers is likewise insignificant. The mean values of forecast revisions for 
cash offers and combination offers are 2.7 and 3.6, respectively. The median values for 
cash offers and combination offers are the same (i.e., 3). There is, however, a difference 
in the target's attitude toward a bid between cash offers and combination offers, hi 
seventeen of the 74 cash offers, or 22.97 percent, the target firm resists the takeover 
attempts. In contrast, none of the targets in the ten combination offers publicly resist the 
bids. Of these 17 hostile cash tender offers, 14 targets (or 82.35 percent) disclose their 
disapproval toward the bid within 30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover 
announcement. Of the ten combination offers, six have sufficient information to
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Descriptive statistics of target firms in the sample
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Mean Median
Range 
Minimum Maximum
Number of forecast revisions submitted 
by analysts for the target in the 
takeover month:
Cash offers 3.54 2 1 11
Combination offers 3.87 3 1 7
Number of forecast revisions submitted 
by analysts for the target each 
month (excluding months -6 to +6): 
Cash offers 2.7 3 0 38
Combination offers 3.6 3 0 23
Market value of the target's equity before 
the announcement (in $ million): 
Cash offers 413.88 115.21 1.10 7,690
Combination offers 406.07 244.36 34.40 4,343
Percentage of value offered for stock 
in combination offers where 
this percentage is known:
Combination offers 54.56 50.01 40.00 80.00
Percentage of takeover attempts where
the target's management resists the 
takeover: Cash offers
Combination offers
Percentage of hostile takeover bids where 
the target's attitude toward a bid 
is disclosed with 30 calendar days 
following the initial takeover bid: 
Cash offers 
Combination offers
22.97 O-e., 17 out of 74) 
0.00
82.35 (i.e., 14 out of 17) 
Not applied
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determine the percentage of the dollar value paid for by stock. The mean value of this 
percentage is 54.56, while the median value is 51.
Table 3.3 reports the average unexpected forecast revision for the sixteen months 
surrounding the takeover announcement for all targets for which forecasts of current- 
year earnings are available. Consistent with Brous and Kini (1993), the average 
unexpected forecast revision of earnings for the current forecast-year over the month 
following the initial announcement (i.e., event month zero) is significantly positive at the 
10 percent level, and 50.7 percent of revisions are positive (significant at the 5 percent 
level based on Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test). Further, Brous and Kini argue that the 
measures of analysts' forecast revisions in their study (and, therefore, in this chapter) are 
understated because investment banking and legal fees related to the bid are likely to 
incur in the year of a takeover attempt. Thus, the result on revisions of analysts' forecast 
of earnings for the current-fiscal year is consistent with the notion that a takeover 
announcement conveys favorable information abut the value of the target firm. The 
mean and median unexpected forecast revisions for the target in response to the takeover 
announcement are 0.015649 and 0.000588, respectively.
Table 3.4 presents monthly revisions of analysts' forecasts o f earnings for the 
following- fiscal year, hi contrast to Table 3.3, Table 3.4 does not support the notion 
that an takeover announcement conveys information about the value of the target. At 
event month 0, neither the mean nor the median value of the unexpected revisions of 
following-year earnings forecasts is significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. The insignificant results formed here for the following forecast-year are
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Table 3.3
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: All offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
# o f 
Month obs.
Raw
FR
Expected
FR
Mean
UFR
Median 
/-value UFR
%
positive
UFR
-11 103 0.001713 -0.007579 0.009292** 2.18 0.000357 54.4
-10 97 -0.009753 0.001183 -0.010936 -1.02 -0.001030 46.4
-9 102 -0.007514 0.005316 -0.012829* -1.95 -0.001159 40.2*
-8 103 -0.003621 0.004352 -0.007973 -1.50 -0.000421 48.5
-7 111 -0.003442 -0.000618 -0.002418 -0.49 -0.000459 44.6
-6 104 -0.008223 -0.003379 -0.004861 -1.17 0.000272 50.5
-5 102 -0.000854 -0.002004 0.001263 0.17 -0.000311 47.6
-4 102 -0.004130 -0.003068 -0.001193 -0.18 -0.001476 42.3
-3 101 -0.010308 -0.002323 -0.008616 -1.41 -0.001809 39.4**
-2 100 -0.000618 -0.001969 0.001261 0.29 0.000506 52.9**
-1 94 -0.012455 -0.001381 -0.011842 -1.55 -0.002006 36.5**
0 84 0.012977 -0.002673 0.015649* 1.86 0.000588 50.7**
1 61 -0.014183 0.003593 -0.017775 -1.42 -0.001462 41.2
2 38 -0.011534 0.001128 -0.012662 -0.77 0.001099 55.3
3 26 -0.002833 -0.001897 -0.000936 -0.04 0.000031 50.0
4 21 -0.010204 0.001269 -0.011473 -0.52 0.000777 52.4
*, **, and denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.4
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: All offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
# o f 
Month obs.
Raw
FR
Expected
FR
Mean
UFR
Median 
/-value UFR
%
positive
UFR
-11 76 0.021332 0.002036 0.002949 0.68 0.001617 57.1
-10 74 0.002215 -0.002105 0.004321 0.66 0.000407 54.1
-9 84 0.012675 0.002426 0.010249 1.22 -0.000606 47.6
-8 78 -0.015920 0.003261 -0.019181’ -1.64 -0.004441 38.5
-7 97 -0.001684 0.003834 -0.005519 -1.25 -0.000897 45.4
-6 89 -0.019104 -0.003559 -0.003633 -0.33 0.003526 56.7*
-5 92 0.003464 -0.000809 -0.006957* -1.87 -0.003215 41.5**
-4 87 0.012873 -0.006292 0.002315 0.36 0.000043 51.1
-3 78 -0.007027 -0.001581 -0.006104 -1.30 0.000251 48.1
-2 85 -0.009683 -0.001629 -0.008251 -0.98 -0.002052 45.3
-1 66 -0.003857 0.001033 -0.004858 -0.53 -0.000285 47.8
0 50 -0.007277 0.004396 -0.011673 -0.82 -0.001355 46.0
1 31 -0.002490 0.000938 -0.003428 -0.49 0.002276 58.1
2 24 -0.001466 0.000495 -0.001961 -0.39 -0.001814 45.8
3 16 0.009720 -0.009813 0.019533 0.83 0.005800 62.5
4 17 -0.014550 0.008019 -0.022569** -2.69 -0.008465 _ _ . M S29.4
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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inconsistent with Brous and Kim's (1993) finding of significantly positive unexpected 
forecast revisions of earnings for the following forecast-year for tender offers announced 
between January 1977 and December 1988. This suggests that the evidence that a 
takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target's value is time- 
specific.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provide unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the 
current forecast-year for cash tender offers and for tender offers funded through a 
combination of cash and stock, respectively. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 reveal little evidence 
supportive of the notion that payment method in takeovers conveys information about 
the target's value. For cash offers, the average unexpected forecast revision for the 
current forecast-year at event month zero (i.e., at the month following the initial 
takeover announcement) is significantly positive at the 5 percent level. The proportion 
of positive unexpected forecast revisions for the current forecast-year, however, is not 
significantly different from 50 percent. Moreover, for month +1, UFR is significantly 
negative and the percent positive is significantly below 50 percent. For combination 
offers, none of the average unexpected forecast revisions or the proportion of positive 
unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the current forecast-year at the 
announcement month is significantly different from zero.
Similarly, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 indicate that unexpected forecast revisions of 
earnings for the following forecast-year disaggregated by payment method yield 
inconclusive results. Specifically, in cash tender offers, the mean value and proportion of 
positive unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the following forecast-year at the
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Table 3.5
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: Cash offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wflcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
%
# o f Raw Experted Mean Median positive
Month obs. FR FR UFR r-vahie UFR UFR
-11 94 0.002359 -0.007979 0.010338** 2.24 0.000287 54.3
-10 85 -0.005285 -0.003015 -0.002270 -0.27 -0.001030 45.9
-9 90 -0.007925 0.002757 -0.010682* -1.79 -0.001159 38.9*'
-8 90 -0.006338 0.000118 -0.006456 -1.35 -0.000380 48.9
-7 98 -0.002561 -0.002073 -0.000020 -0.00 -0.000449 44.4
-6 90 -0.008476 -0.002665 -0.005834 -1.24 -0.000724 46.2
-5 89 -0.007392 -0.002780 -0.004704 -1.16 0.000278 50.0
-4 90 -0.008012 -0.005301 -0.002947 -0.42 -0.001571 41.3
-3 90 -0.010500 -0.003567 -0.007648 -1.14 -0.001597 39.8
-2 87 -0.004634 -0.004179 -0.000650 -0.14 0.000460 51.7
-1 84 0.001772 -0.004158 -0.011189 -1.31 -0.001694 37.9
0 74 0.013250 -0.002802 0.016052** 1.88 -0.000099 48.4
1 53 -0.025232 0.002389 -0.027621** -2.05 -0.001652 37.2*
2 29 0.007280 -0.002389 0.009669 1.74 0.001477 58.6
3 20 -0.025116 0.002827 -0.027943 -1.54 -0.002755 40.0
4 17 -0.010645 0.001077 -0.011722 -0.43 0.000814 58.8
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.6
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: Combination offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
# o f 
Month obs.
Raw
FR
Expected
FR
Mean
UFR
Median 
/-value UFR
%
positive
UFR
-11 9 -0.005034 -0.003406 -0.001627 -0.25 0.000938 55.6
-10 12 -0.041402 0.030922 -0.072324 -1.14 -0.001386 50.0
-9 12 -0.004431 0.024505 -0.028936 -0.84 -0.001326 50.0
-8 13 0.015183 0.033659 -0.018476 -0.69 -0.001338 46.2
-7 13 -0.010145 0.010350 -0.020495 -1.42 -0.003382 46.2
-6 14 -0.006580 -0.007968 0.001388 0.24 0.004285 78.6*
-5 13 0.045418 0.003306 0.042112 0.82 -0.004840 30.8
-4 12 0.025634 0.013677 0.011957 0.60 -0.000488 50.0
-3 11 -0.008682 0.007853 -0.016536 -1.45 -0.007664 36.4*
-2 13 0.026872 0.012818 0.014054 1.13 0.004895 61.5
-1 10 -0.013652 0.003677 -0.017329** -2.26 -0.017187 30.0**
0 10 0.011229 -0.001844 0.013073 1.39 0.002408 60.0
1 8 0.045206 0.010063 0.035143 1.25 0.005164 62.5
2 9 -0.072157 0.012462 -0.084619 -1.32 -0.014180 44.4
3 6 0.071446 -0.017641 0.089086 1.34 0.018589 83.3
4 4 -0.008331 0.002083 -0.010414 -1.32 -0.009459 25.0
*, **, and denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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announcement month are insignificant (with an average value of -0.01591 and a /-value 
of -0.99, and a proportion of positive unexpected revisions equal to 44.2 percent with a 
r-value o f -0.39). In combination offers, the average announcement-month unexpected 
revision and proportion of positive unexpected revisions are likewise insignificant at the 
conventional levels (0.01438 with a /-value of 0.76, and 0.57 percent with a r-value of 
0.37, respectively).
A regression analysis framework is used to formally test whether the target's 
resistance toward a bid is associated with an unexpected downward revision of analyst 
earnings forecasts, and whether payment method in takeover bids conveys information 
about the value of the target. The test results are provided in Table 3.9. Consistent with 
Brous and Kini's (1993) findings, / '’-values for both regression analyses are insignificant 
at the conventional levels (0.59 when the dependent variable is UFRi with respect to the 
current forecast-year, and 0.79 when the dependent variable is UFRi with respect to the 
following forecast-year, respectively). This means, first, that target's resistance variable 
RESISTi is not important in explaining unexpected forecast revisions for either the 
current forecast-year or the following forecast-year. In other words, the target's 
resistance toward a takeover bid is not associated with unexpected earnings forecast 
revisions.
Second, the insignificant F-values for both regression analyses in Table 3.9 also 
imply that the payment method variable, METHOD*, is not important in explaining 
unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the current forecast-year and the following 
forecast-year at the initial takeover announcement. Thus, the evidence in this study does
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Table 3.7
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: Cash offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage o f positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
%
# of Raw Expected Mean Median positive
Month obs. FR FR UFR r-value UFR UFR
-11 67 0.002407 0.000977 0.001430 0.30 0.001481 55.2
-10 65 0.003160 -0.005291 0.008451 1.21 0.000517 55.4
-9 72 0.000577 -0.002935 0.003512 0.59 -0.000295 48.6
-8 69 -0.010045 -0.001511 -0.008534 -1.60 -0.004907 37.7“
-7 84 -0.004832 0.000176 -0.005008 -1.20 -0.000941 42.9
-6 78 -0.009265 -0.005504 -0.003761 -0.30 0.003590 57.7
-5 81 -0.008903 0.000095 -0.008966** -2.26 -0.003574 39.0*
-4 77 0.018308 -0.006670 0.006015 0.96 0.000043 51.3
-3 70 -0.006659 -0.002804 -0.004573 -0.93 0.000251 47.9
-2 76 -0.011778 -0.002351 -0.009674 -1.03 -0.002159 42.9
-1 59 -0.001335 0.000566 -0.001823 -0.18 0.000206 51.7
0 43 -0.009830 0.006085 -0.015915 -0.99 -0.001369 44.2
1 26 -0.006931 0.002268 -0.009199 -1.27 0.001477 53.8
2 18 -0.001932 0.000156 -0.002087 -0.44 -0.001814 44.4
3 12 0.025866 -0.007400 0.033266 1.19 0.002414 58.3
4 14 -0.022735 0.002099 -0.024834** -2.57 -0.010504 21.4*
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.8
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 -
December 1995: Combination offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero 
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date, 
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast 
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null 
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and, 
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test 
and Wflcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses, 
respectively.
# o f 
Month obs.
Raw
FR
Expected
FR
Mean
UFR /-value
Median
UFR
%
positive
UFR
-11 9 0.148128 0.009132 0.014259 1.56 0.002706 70.0
-10 9 -0.004605 0.020900 -0.025505 -1.69 -0.006091 44.4*
-9 12 0.085266 0.034597 0.050669 1.09 -0.001761 41.7
-8 9 -0.060963 0.039846 -0.100809 -1.09 -0.000388 44.4
-7 13 0.018654 0.027471 -0.008817 -0.45 0.001828 61.5
-6 11 -0.083060 0.009081 -0.002726 -0.30 0.000113 50.0
-5 11 0.087972 -0.006907 0.007842 0.76 0.003505 58.3
-4 10 -0.029516 -0.003344 -0.026172 -0.92 -0.001937 50.0
-3 8 -0.010380 0.009124 -0.019504 -1.24 -0.001573 50.0
-2 9 0.008239 0.004467 0.003772 0.51 0.010600 66.7
-1 7 -0.025473 0.004968 -0.030441 -1.73 -0.012973 14.3*
0 7 0.008403 -0.005984 0.014387 0.76 0.001563 57.1
1 5 0.020603 -0.005976 0.026579 1.65 0.017461 80.0
2 6 -0.000068 0.001513 -0.001581 -0.10 0.004482 50.0
3 4 -0.038719 -0.017054 -0.021665 -0.53 0.014506 75.0
4 3 0.023648 0.035648 -0.012000 -0.70 0.001586 66.7
\  **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.9
Estimated coefficients o f regressions for revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for
takeover bids over the period January 1988 to December 1995
The f-values are in parentheses. The regression model tested is:
UFR/ — cto + a i METHOD; +  ct2 RESISTf+- £/ (26)
where UFR/ = unexpected forecast revision for target i at takeover
announcement;
METHODj = 1 for an offer funded through stock or a combination of 
cash and stock; 0 for a cash offer,
RESIST; = 1 if the target's management is opposed to the bid within 
30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover 
announcement; and 0 otherwise;
£/ = statistical error term.
Dependent variable
UFR; with respect to 
current fbrecast-year
UFR, with respect to 
following forecast-year
Intercept 0.0245* 0.031**
(1.75) (1.99)
METHOD; -0.011 -0.020
(-0.35) (-0.56)
RESIST; -0.027 -0.033
(-1.08) (-1.22)
F-value 0.59 0.79
I? 0.02 0.02
Number of
observations 84 50
* and ** denote statistical significance at the ten and five percent levels, respectively, for
two-tailed tests.
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not support the notion that the method of payment in takeover bids conveys information 
about the value of the targets.
3.7. Conclusions
This chapter empirically tests whether the payment method in takeovers conveys 
information about the value of the target firms. This study does not use the targets' 
share price reactions to takeover announcements because of the presence of tax effect 
associated with the method of payment. Rather, this paper uses analyst earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for the expected value o f the targets to test the information 
hypothesis (with respect to the targets) of the medium of exchange in takeovers.
Empirical tests in this study yield two major results. First, no evidence is found 
supportive of the notion that the method of payment in takeover bids conveys 
information about the value of the targets. Unexpected analyst forecast revisions for 
tender offers funded through a combination o f stock and cash are not significantly 
different from those for cash offers. This suggests that the market perceives that the 
information, if any, revealed by payment method in takeovers is not about the value of 
the target firms.
Second, inconsistent with the prior study ofBrous and Kini (1993), takeover 
announcements result in analysts revising upward their earnings forecasts for the targets 
for the current forecast-year, but not for the following forecast-year. Moreover, the 
upward revision is statistically significant for cash offers but not for others. The 
inconsistency with Brous and Kini suggests that prior study’s result that the market
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perceives a takeover bid to convey favorable information about the target's value is time- 
specific.
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Chapter 4
Changes in Payment Terms in the Takeover Process
4.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes how changes in the medium of exchange in the takeover 
process affect the value of the bidder's common shares. Two major hypotheses are 
proposed to analyze changes in the terms o f exchange: (1) there is information revealed 
about the value of the firm in announcements of changes in payment terms, and (2) there 
is a wealth transfer between shareholders of the bidder and those of the target.
This chapter finds that after controlling for the change in takeover premium, 
bidders' share price reactions to announcements of increases in the cash component as a 
percentage of the acquisition price are generally more favorable than those to 
announcements of increases in the stock component. An increase in the cash component, 
on average, generates approximately two percent announcement-period excess return to 
bidders, relative to an increase in the stock component. This is generally consistent with 
Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory that the market views the decision to issue common 
shares to finance investment projects as unfavorable information about the value of the 
issuing firms. There is no evidence to support the view that the market's re-evaluation of 
the bidder's shares upon announcements of revisions of payment terms is a result of any 
concurrent changes in takeover premium.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
theoretical discussion and the empirical hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the method of
94
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analysis. Section 4.4 explains the data used in this study. Section 4.5 presents empirical 
results. Conclusions are provided in section 4.6.
4.2. Theoretical discussion and empirical hypotheses
Previous studies by Myers and Mqhif (1984) and Roll (1986) suggest how the 
market should react to changes in payment terms: the information hypothesis and the 
wealth transfer hypothesis, respectively.
The information hypothesis indicates that the market alters its valuation of the 
bidder's common shares based on information inferred from a bidders' decision to revise 
the payment terms. This argument builds on Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory that the 
market views the use of common stock to finance investment projects as unfavorable 
information about the value of issuing firms. Accordingly, in corporate takeovers, 
announcements of increases in the stock component as a percentage of acquisition price 
for the target convey negative information about the value of the bidder's shares. The 
market would revise downward these bidders' share prices. Conversely, announcements 
of increases in the cash component reveal the bidder managers' belief that the bidder’s 
common shares are at least not overvalued in the market. Thus, the market would on 
average revise upward these bidders' share prices upon these announcements.
The wealth transfer hypothesis views changes in payment terms as a byproduct of 
revisions in the overall takeover process. Revision in terms can arise because, for 
example, a hostile bidder perceives an increase in the effectiveness of the target's 
resistance. Another reason for changes in terms would be the entry of other bidders, 
which are likely to bid up the takeover premium for the target. Thus, changes in
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payment terms per se might not convey any information about the value of firms in
takeovers but represent bidder firms conceding more of the expected gains from the
acquisition to the target's shareholders to increase the probability of a successful bid.
Roll (1986) argues that a large portion o f announcement excess returns for target firms 
in takeovers is a wealth transfer to the target from the bidder, the result of the bidder's 
overoptimistic view of its abilities to manage the target firm. Thus, the wealth transfer 
hypothesis predicts that changes in the market value of the bidder at announcements of 
changes in payment terms would be a negative function of changes in the takeover 
premium.
4 J . Method of analysis
4.3.1. Measuring the announcement excess returns
4.3.1.1. Event study method
Share price reactions to announcements of changes in the medium of exchange in 
takeovers are measured by the standard market model event study method as described 
in Brown and Warner (198S). Under the assumption of semi-strong form market 
efficiency, the procedure provides an estimate of how the market interprets the 
information contained in the announcement of a change in the payment terms of a 
takeover bid.
Consistent with the procedure used elsewhere in this dissertation, the estimation 
period for the market model parameters spans a 200-trading-day period ( from 250 days 
before through 51 days before the event's first appearance date in the Wall Street 
Journal). The parameters of the market model are estimated by regressing individual
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daily returns on the corresponding equal-weighted daily market index returns:
RJt=aj + bjRm+ fy (27)
where:
Rjt = rate of return for security j on day t,
Rmt -  rate of return for the market index on day t, 
aj -  mean return not explained by the market, 
bj -  security j's sensitivity to the market's return, 
fy = the statistical error.
All returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
The predicted return for a firm on a day in the event period is the return 
predicted by the market model on that day, using the estimates of a,- and bj from the pre- 
event estimation period. That is, the predicted return for security j on day t in the event 
window is:
Rjt — Qj + bjRm (28)
The prediction error for security j on day t in the event window is then defined
as:
PEft—Rft~ Rjt (29)
The cumulative prediction error for security j over the event window t = tt to t2 is 
calculated as:
ti
cpeimm1= 00)
t=t\
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The share price reaction for the bidding firms that announce changes in payment
terms is estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error, APE, for all bidders
on dayf:
A P E , = - ^ - f l P& (31)
M  j= l
where N is the number of bidders in the sample.
The cumulative average prediction error (CAPE) over an event-window (t= t\ to 
fe) is the sum of the daily average prediction errors:
CAPE = £  APEt (32)
t=n
The price reaction to the announcement is the CAPE estimated over the two-day event 
window (t= -1,0).
To test whether the CAPE of a sample is significantly different from zero, the test
statistic is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the square root of the product of the
estimation-period variance and the number of days in the CAPE event-window (//, t2).
The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis that the CAPE is
equal to zero if the APE are independent, identically distributed, and normal.
4.3.I.2. Robustness of measuring excess returns: mean- and market-adjusted 
returns
As in the earlier chapter, the sensitivity of the results to the event study 
procedure based on the market model is examined by repeating the analysis using both 
mean- and market-adjusted returns to calculate prediction errors obtained. The use of 
mean-adjusted returns eliminates the problem of specification of risk factors of stock
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returns in the standard event-study method. The use of market-adjusted returns 
addresses the problem of controlling for market-wide price movements on the 
announcement date.
4.3.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis
The following regression analysis framework is used to analyze changes in 
payment method in takeovers:
CPE, = 0o + Pi STOCK, + pz AP, + fc AP, •STOCK, + e , (33)
where:
CPE, = two-day (-1,0) cumulative excess returns earned by the
bidding firm at announcement i,
A P, = changes in acquisition price as a percentage of the market
value of the bidder's equity prior to announcement /, 
STOCK, -  1 for an increase in the stock component as a percentage
of the acquisition price; and 0 otherwise.
The bidder's market capitalization is used as the denominator in calculating A P, because 
the dependent variable, CPEi is measured as a percentage (i.e., stock returns) on the 
bidder's equity.
An interaction term, A P,»STOCKh is included in the analysis to capture the 
effects of changes in terms on the probability of success o f the offer. Increases in the 
takeover premium are, naturally, likely to increase the probability of the success o f an 
offer, hi addition, Huang and Walkling (1987) and Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) 
note that the bidder in stock offers must submit a registration statement and obtain
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approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission before it can offer new shares 
to the target's shareholders. Thus, the use of all cash as the method of payment reduces 
the tune necessary to complete the takeover process. In a hostile bid, fester transactions 
give the target management less chance and time to implement takeover defense, such as 
soliciting a white knight (Le., a friendly and late-entiy bidder). Offers involving stock 
are, therefore, likely to have a lower possibility of takeover success than are all cash 
offers. By extrapolation (and consistent with some market folklore), increases in the 
cash component of an offer would raise the probability of success of that bid. Thus, if 
the method of payment influences the probability of success of an offer, changes in the 
payment terms also are likely to influence that probability. Since any share price effect 
on the bidder from changes in acquisition price reflects both the wealth transfer effect (as 
above) and the probability of takeover success, the regression includes the interaction 
term.
The test of the empirical hypotheses described in section 4.2 is equivalent to the 
tests of coefficients and fc in equation (21). That is, the information hypothesis 
predicts 3i will be negative, while the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts 32  will be 
negative. If changes in the payment terms change the influence of the wealth transfer 
effect for increases in stock (by changing the probability of success, as argued), then the 
sign of 3s will indicate the direction of that interactive effect.
4.4. Data
The sample of announcements of changes in payment method come from two 
sources: (1) the 348 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December1995 as
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described in the second chapter, and (2) searches of the Lexis/Nexis database. The 
Lexis/Nexis database is searched for combinations of keywords "changeS", "alterS", 
"revisS", "modify", "modifies", "modified", "payment method", "medium of exchange", 
"cash and stock", "combination", "all-cash", and "all-stock” to generate a sample of 
takeover announcements. After elimination of all obviously unrelated announcements, 
the remaining announcements are checked against the Wall Street Journal to identify 
announcements of changes in payment terms in takeovers. In addition, to be included in 
the sample, the bidders must have stock return data on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database over a 250-day period prior to the announcement date 
so that the market reaction to an announcement can be estimated. Partial acquisitions 
are excluded from the sample. The process above yields the final sample of 30 
announcements of revisions of the medium of exchange in corporate takeovers made 
over the period January 1976 to December 1995.
4.5. Empirical results
4.5.1. Distribution of the sample
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics. Panel A reports the distribution of the 
thirty announcements of changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers made over the 
period January 1976 to December 1995. Twenty announcements report increases in the 
cash component as a percentage of acquisition price, while ten announcements report 
increases in the stock component. Of these thirty announcements, in three the bidders 
revise the payment terms twice (see Table 4.5 for details of the announcements). To 
estimate how often the payment terms in takeovers are altered, these thirty
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Table 4.1
Summary statistics for the sample o f announcements of changes in payment terms in
corporate takeovers made over the period January 1976 to December 1995
Panel A: Distribution of announcements of changes in payment terms by years
Year 1976 1978 1979 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Increase
instock 0 2  0 1 0 0  1 1 0
Increase 
in cash 2 0  1 1 1 1 1 0 2
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total over 
1976-1995
Increase
instock 1 2  0 2  0 0  0 0 10
Increase 
in cash 2 0  2 2  2 1 1 1 2 0
Panel B: Payment methods before and after announcements of changes in payment terms
\  New hiri
Combination offers
Initial b i d \
Cash
offers
Increase in 
cash portion
Increase in 
stock portion
Stock
offers Total
Cash offers Not applied Not applied 2 2 4
Combo offers 9 5 3 3 2 0
Stock offers 3 3 Not applied Not applied 6
Total 1 2 8 5 5 30
(table con'd)
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Panel C: Characteristics of announcements of changes in payment terms in takeovers
made over the period January 1976 to December 199S
Range
Mean Median Minimum Maximum
The market value o f the bidder's equity 
prior to the announcement of 
changes in payment terms
(in million dollars) 3,497.64 402.71 7.52 39,180.63
Changes in takeover premium
(in miffion dollars) 30.03 0.00 -75.20 853.73
Changes in takeover premium divided by 
the market value of the bidder's
equity 0.0067 0.00 -0.0859 0.2422
Panel D: A description o f the nature of the takeover bids
COMPET takes a value o f one if there are more than one bidders for an announcement 
of changes in payment terms; and zero otherwise. RESIST equals one if the target's 
management publicly resist the takeover bid; and zero otherwise.
Number of announcements Percentage of the entire sample
COMPET = 1 2 6.67%
RESIST =1 9 30.0%
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announcements are checked against the 324 takeover announcements used in the second 
chapter. Results reveal that of the 30 announcements of changes in payment terms, eight 
also appear in the 324 announcements used in the second chapter. Thus, roughly 
speaking, 2.50 percent (Le., 8 /  324) of all takeover announcements involving publicly 
traded firms experience revisions of payment terms.
Panel B of Table 4.1 reports the distribution of changes in payment terms in 
takeovers disaggregated by how the payment terms are altered. Two features are 
noteworthy. First, out of all the 30 announcements in the final sample, 20 (= 12 + 8 ) 
announcements, or 66.67 percent, experience increases in the cash component as a 
percentage of the acquisition price. Second, of 20 announcements with a combination of 
cash and stock as the initial payment method, 14 (= 9 + 5) takeovers, or 70 percent, shift 
toward more cash payment. Thus, provided that changes in payment terms are 
warranted, the decisions on changes are asymmetric: changes in the medium of exchange 
in takeovers during the sample period tend to be increases in the cash component, or 
equivalently, decreases in the stock component.
The mean values of selected characteristics of the announcements are presented 
in Panel C ofTable 4.1. Of the thirty announcements, in 14 announcements (1 1  and 3 
involving increases in the cash and stock components, respectively) changes in the cash 
component (and thus the stock component) as a percentage of the acquisition price can 
be determined. The percentage of changes in payment terms for remaining 16 (= 30 - 
14) announcements cannot be determined because, for example, their payment terms 
involve convertibles or preferred stock. The changes in payment terms for these 14
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announcements where the stock and cash components are known are substantial 
Specifically, the mean value of changes in terms for the 11 cash-increase announcements 
is 47.95 percentage points increases in the cash component; the median value is 51.44 
percentage points. Bidders in the 3 stock-increase announcements increase the stock 
component by 45,100, and 100 percentage points, respectively.
Panel C of Table 4.1 also reports that the mean size of the bidder's market 
capitalization prior to the announcement of changes in payment terms is $ 3.50 billion 
and the median value is S 402.71. The mean value of changes in takeover premium is S 
30.03 million and the median value is zero. The last row of Panel C shows that the 
average change in the acquisition price is very small relative to the market value of the 
bidder. The mean ratio of changes in acquisition price to the bidder's market 
capitalization prior to the announcement is 0.0067; while the median ratio is zero.
Panel D of Table 4.1 provides additional information about the nature of the 
takeover bids. In nine of the thirty, announcements of changes in payment terms, the 
target management publicly resists the takeover bid. Bidders in five of these nine 
contested offers increase the cash component in the payment terms. Thus, target 
resistance does not seem to favor increases in one medium over the other. In addition, 
only two of thirty, takeovers involve more than one bidder as disclosed by the Wall 
Street Journal. Both of these involve a switch to all-cash offers from offers funded 
through a combination of cash and stock. The sample is too small for any conclusions, 
but this result is consistent with Fishman's (1989) argument and market folklore that cash 
is used to preclude or defeat other bidders.
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4.5.2. Share price reactions to announcements of changes in payment terms and 
regression results
Table 4.2 reports the bidder's share price reactions to announcements of revisions 
of payment terms disaggregated by changes in takeover premium and changes in 
payment terms. Holding the change in takeover premium constant, the bidder's 
announcement-period excess returns in cash offers are generally more favorable than 
those in stock offers. Specifically, when the cash component is increased but the 
takeover premium remains unchanged, the mean announcement-period excess returns to 
bidder is 2.18 percent, significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (p-value = 
0.0138); the median value is 1.81 percent, hi contrast, the bidders who decrease the 
cash component (or, equivalently, increase the stock component) but do not change the 
takeover premium experience insignificant announcement excess returns. When there is 
an increase in the cash component and a decrease in takeover premium, the bidders 
experience, on average, a 3.81 percent excess return, significant at the 10 percent level 
On spite of only 4 observations in this group), hi comparison, the announcement excess 
returns to bidders who decrease both cash component and takeover premium are 
insignificant at the conventional levels. The evidence on bidders who increase both the 
stock component and the acquisition price is less clear. The average announcement 
excess return to these bidders is not significantly different from zero (the median value is 
- 0.55 percent), a result not supportive of the information hypothesis and the wealth 
transfer hypothesis. The number of observations for this group of bidders, however, is 
only two.
:iI !
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Table 4.2
Announcement cumulative excess returns disaggregated by changes in payment terms 
and of takeover premium
P-values o f f-tests are in parentheses. The first, second, and third numbers in square 
brackets are the median value o f announcement excess returns, the number of bidders 
with positive announcement excess returns, and the number of bidders, respectively.
Changes in payment terms
Increase in Increase in
stock component cash component Sub-sample
Increase in -0.55% 0 .2 2 % 0 .0 0 %
takeover (0.8655) (0.8931) (0.9986)
premium [-0.55%, 1,2] [0.16%, 3, 5] [0.16%, 4, 7]
Decrease in -0 .6 6  % 3.81 %* 2.32%
takeover (0.8782) (0.0803) (0.2037)
premium [-0 .6 6 %, 1, 2 ] [4.20 %, 4,4] [2.93%, 5, 6 ]
No change -0.32 % 2.18%** 1.30%**
in takeover (0.6914) (0.0138) (0.0494)
premium [0.32%, 3, 6 ] [1.81 %, 9, 11] [0.93%, 12, 17]
Sub-sample -0.44% 
(0.5881) 
[0.32%, 5, 10]
2 .0 1 %*** 
(0.0058) 
[2.28%, 16, 2 0 ]
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 ,5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
Table 4.3 presents an ANOVA test examining changes in variance based on the 
directions o f changes in payment terms and changes in acquisition price. As argued 
above, an interaction term is included to capture the effects of changes in payment terms 
on the probability of the success of an offer. The overall test yields an F-value 2.53, 
significant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the effect o f increases in the stock 
component (measured as a category) on bidders' two-day announcement excess returns 
is significantly negative at the 5 percent level (F-value 6.26). No supporting evidence of 
either the effect of changes in the acquisition price or the interactive effect is found.
Because changes in acquisition price are continuous, a multivariate regression 
framework is used to examine whether changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers 
convey information about the bidder's value. The announcement-period is defined as a 
two-day event window (days -1  and 0 ) because it is possible that announcements are 
made after the markets close. Changes in acquisition price are measured as a continuous 
number rather than a discrete number as in the ANOVA test above.
The regression results, presented in Table 4.4, are consistent with the ANOVA 
results. After controlling for concurrent changes in takeover premium, bidders' share 
price reactions to announcements of increases in the cash component are more favorable 
than those for increases in the stock component. No evidence is found in support of the 
notion that a wealth transfer between bidder and target explains the bidder's share price 
reactions to announcements of changes in the medium of exchange. Specifically, the 
second column ofTable 4.4 reports coefficient estimates using market-model cumulative
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Table 4.3
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for announcements of changes in payment terms in
takeovers from January 1976 to December 1995
A PRC is defined as changes in acquisition price for announcement i and takes three 
levels (i.e., no change, increase, or decrease in acquisition price) in the ANOVA test. 
STOCKtakts a value of one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of 
acquisition price for the target; and zero otherwise.
Source of 
variance
Sum of 
squares
Degrees of 
freedom F-value
STOCK 0.00365422 1 6.26**
APRC 0.00155200 2 1.33
STOCK-APRC 0.00164607 2 1.41
Overall test F-value = 2.53*
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively, in 
two-tailed tests.
/
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prediction errors, CPEs, as the dependent variable. The overall test of the null hypothesis 
Pi=32 = 03 = 0 is not rejected at the 10 percent leveL The indicator variable, STOCK, 
which takes a value of one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of 
acquisition price for the target and zero otherwise, is significantly negative at the 1 0  
percent level (/-value = -1.935). The intercept estimate, 1.7 percent (f-value = 3.047), 
can be interpreted as the average announcement excess returns to bidders who increase 
the cash-stock ratio in payment method (i.e., STOCK -  0) but do not change the overall 
value of the acquisition price for the target (thus, AP — 0). The estimates of the 
coefficients for other independent variables, A Pt and interaction term AP^STOCK,, are 
not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Thus, there is no evidence 
supportive of a wealth transfer between bidder and target as an explanation for bidder 
excess returns at the announcement of changes in payment terms. A possible reason for 
the insignificant result on the wealth transfer hypothesis is that the average change in 
acquisition price is very small relative to the market value of the bidder. As indicated in 
Panel C of Table 4.1, the mean value of changes in acquisition price divided by the 
market value of the bidder's equity is only 0.0067; while the median value is zero.
Because the dependent variable in the multivariate regression analysis is measured as 
two-day announcement cumulative prediction errors, CPEs, it is likely that the relatively 
imprecise measurement of CPEs (because o f for example, bid-ask spreads) explains the 
insignificant results on the wealth transfer hypothesis.
The regression equation estimated in Table 4.4 predicts a significant and positive 
share price response to an announcement of an increase in the cash component (i.e., +1.7
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percent with a /rvalue o f0.0052), but an insignificant share price reaction for an increase 
in the stock component (-0.2 percent -1 .7  - 1.9 percent, /7-value = 0.73) in the absence 
of changes in takeover premium. One possible explanation for this result is that 
increases in the stock component likely reflect both the signaling effect and the 
investment effect from a takeover. Revisions o f payment terms can increase this 
investment effect by enhancing the probability o f takeover success through catering to 
the needs of the target's shareholders (for example, the tax considerations) or to those of 
the target's management (for example, the concern of target managerial ownership,
Stulz, 1988). To control for this investment effect, announcements of increases in the 
cash component must be used as a baseline against which those of increases in the stock 
component are analyzed. Accordingly, the result in Table 4.4 that STOCK is 
significantly negative indicates that the market infers the choice of changes in payment 
terms (i.e., an increase in either the cash or the stock component) as indicative o f the 
bidder's belief whether the bidder's shares are overpriced in the market.
To examine whether the results are sensitive to how the excess returns are 
measured, the market- and mean-adjusted returns are also used to calculate CPEs for the 
dependent variable. The use of market-adjusted returns takes account of potential 
market-wide price movements at the announcement dates; while the use of mean- 
adjusted returns avoids the specifications of risk factors of stock returns. Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 4.4 present the regression results using announcement-period market- and 
mean-adjusted returns to generate CPEs. The findings are similar to those using the 
market model CPE as the dependent variable and show the results are robust to the
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Tabic 4.4
Regression analysis for announcements o f changes in payment terms in takeovers over
the period January 1976 to December 1995
Dependent variable is CPE,, two-day cumulative excess returns earned by the bidding 
firm at announcement i. AP , is defined as changes in takeover premium as a percentage 
ofthe bidder's market capitalization prior to announcement i. STOCKitakes a value of 
one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of acquisition price for the 
target; and zero otherwise. Market-adjusted CPE uses value-weighted CRSP index 
returns for obtaining cumulative excess returns, f-vahies are in parentheses.
The regression model analyzed is the following;
CPE, »  fo + faSTOCK, + fc AP, + foA P , •STOCK, + e» (33)
Market model 
CPE
Market-adjusted
CPE
Mean-adjusted
CPE
Intercept 0.017*** 0.017*** 0 .0 2 0 ***
(3.047) (3.076) (3.321)
STOCK, -0.019* -0 .0 2 0 ** -0.023**
(-1.935) (-2.056) (-2.132)
A P, -0.197 -0.167 -0.189
(-1.438) (-1 .2 2 2 ) (-1.260)
AP,•STOCK, 0.093 0.092 0.103
(0.548) (0.541) (0.558)
F 2.581* 2.327* 2.493*
R2 0.23 0 .2 1 0 .2 2
Adjusted R2 0.14 0 .1 2 0.13
Number of 
observations 30 30 30
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests.
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alternative calculations of CPEs. Only STOCK and the intercept exhibit coefficient 
estimates significantly different from zero at conventional (5 and 1 percents, 
respectively) levels.
4.6. Conclusions
A small portion of corporate takeovers experiences revisions of their payment 
terms. This chapter presents evidence about the effects of equity issuance within the 
framework of changes in payment method in takeovers. Two issues are addressed in this 
chapter one, whether the market infers information about the value of the bidders from 
the decision to revise the terms o f payment, and two, whether the market re-evaluations 
o f bidders' common shares upon announcements of revisions of payment terms are a 
result of a wealth transfer between bidder and target. The results indicate that, after 
controlling for the effect of changes in takeover premium, bidder's share price reactions 
to announcements of increases in the cash component are generally more favorable than 
those for increases in the stock component. The relatively unfavorable bidder's share 
price reactions to announcements involving increases in the stock component is not 
related to changes in takeover premium accompanying revisions of payment terms. 
Cross-sectionally, the decision to increase the stock component in the offer generates a 
statistically significant and negative 1.9 percent excess returns to bidders, relative to 
announcements of increasing the cash component. Thus, the evidence is generally 
consistent with Myers and Majlufs (1984) model that the market believes that corporate 
management, acting in the best interests of shareholders, will not issue common shares 
unless managers believe the firm's shares to be overvalued.
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Table 4.5. Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over the period January 1976 to December 1995
The stated or inferred reasons for changes in payment method are in parentheses. The first and second numbers in the square brackets are the 
percentages of a  combination offer funded by cash and stock, respectively. No such percentages are assigned for a combination offer if the terms are 
too complicated to determine the percentages of cash and stock in a combination offer (for example, the offer involves convertible debts as payment 
method).
Bidder firm Original bid New bid
Bidding Public resistance 
war ? to the initial bid ?
Changes in 
takeover premium ?
Coca-Cola Enterprises
Xonics Inc.
Mercantile National
Consolidated Foods
Combination
Stock [51.44%, 48.56%] No No Decrease
(Analysts suggested that the target's business conditions were worse than they were a few months ago.)
Stock Combination No Yes No
(The bidder was in final negotiations with the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the investigation of
possible securities violations.)
Combination and 
Combination an increase in cash
(No reason was given.)
No No No
Combination and
Combination an increase in cash No No No
(Under the new offer, the family controlling the target would receive cash rather than a combination of cash and 
securities previously announced.)
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S
Bidder firm Original bid New bid
Bidding Public resistance Changes in
war ? to the initial bid ? takeover premium ?
Florida National Banks 
of Florida Inc.
Monumental Corp. 
Sun Banks Inc.
Damson Oil Corp.
GAF Corp.
Turner Broadcasting 
Systems Inc.
Combination Cash
(No reason was given.)
Combination Cash
(No reason was given,)
No
No
No
No
No
Increase
Combination Combination
[40%, 60%] [45%, 55%] No No No
(The change was made because the bidder management believed that bidder's shares were undervalued.)
Combination Cash Yes No No
(The Wall Street Journal described as "novel" the initial payment method, which called for 25 percent of the 
target's shares to be paid for by securities whose payoffs were contingent on the bidder's subsidiary.)
Combination Cash No Yes No
(Sources said that the move was partly intended to frustrate the target's attempt to install a "poison pill".)
Cash Combination No No No
(The bidder management indicated that it could not raise financing for the initial all-cash offer.)
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements o f changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 1995
Bidding Public resistance Changes in 
Bidder firm Original bid New bid war ? to the initial bid ? takeover premium ?
Unisys Corp.
Acmat Corp.
Acmat Corp.
PacifiCoip
PacifiCorp
Combination
[40%, 60%] Cash
(No reason was given.)
No No No
Combination
Stock [33.9%, 66.1%] No No Increase
(The target did not respond to the initial stock offer. The bidder sweetened the offer and altered the payment 
method.)
Combination
[33,9%, 66.1%] Cash No No Decrease
(The bidder revised, again, the offer. The new cash offer had a slightly lower market value than the previous 
combination offer.)
Combination Stock No Yes No
(The bidder argued that the package was altered because the target's assets were deeply impaired.)
Stock Cash No Yes Increase
(This second-time modification of the terms was intended to make the deal as easy to understand as possible.)
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S
Bidder firm Original bid New bid
Bidding Public resistance 
war 7 to the initial bid ?
in
takeover premium ?
Tyson Foods Inc.
Healthcare Services Group
Bankers Trust of South 
Carolina
Bankers Trust of South 
Carolina
American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.
Vidmark Inc.
Combination
[91.11%, 8.89%] Cash Yes Yes
(The bidder stepped up its efforts to acquire the target by launching an all-cash tender offer.)
Combination and
Combination a decrease in cash No No
(The terms were changed because the bidder's annual revenues were lower than expected.)
Convertible
Preferred stock preferred No No
(The bidder re-submitted its offer after the bidder withdrew the initial bid without elaboration.)
Convertible
preferred Stock No No
(No reason was given on this second-time revision in payment method.)
Increase
Decrease
No
No
NoCash Stock No Yes
(The bidder switched from a cash tender offer to a "friendly" merger as the target management eventually agreed to 
talk with the bidder about the offer.)
Stock Cash No
(No information concerning the reasons was disclosed.)
No No
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S
Bidder firm Original bid New bid
Bidding Public resistance 
war ? to the initial bid 7
Changes in 
takeover premium ?
House of Fabric Inc.
SuperValu Inc.
International Family 
Entertainment Inc.
International Family 
Entertainment Inc.
California Energy Co.
Cash Stock No Yes
(The initial hostile tender offer ended up with a mutually-agreed stock offer.)
Increase
Combination Combination and
[92,35%, 7.63%] an increase in cash No No Decrease
(The Wall Street Journal suggested that changes in the terms might be related to a shift in the competition in the 
target's industry.)
Combination and
Combination an increase in cash No No No
(The move was intended to give the target's shareholders more choices concerning the payment method.)
Combination
[75%, 25%] Cash No No No
(The bidder launched an all-cash tender offer out of concern over other companies gaining more control of the 
target through the purchase of the target's shares in the open market, The target in this announcement differs from 
that in the announcement above.)
Combination
[71,43%, 28.57%] Cash No Yes
(The bidder escalated its efforts to acquire the target by raising the bid.)
Increase
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S
Bidder firm Original bid New bid
Bidding Public resistance 
war ? to the initial bid 7
Changes in 
takeover premium ?
James River Corp.
McCaw Cellular 
Communications Inc.
American International 
Group Inc,
Old Kent Financial Corp.
Combo and
Combination an increase in stock No No
(Changes in the offer were to reflect modifications of the target’s asset disposition.)
Decrease
Cash Combination No Yes Increase
(Changes in terms were made subsequent to unfavorable court ruling on the target in an unrelated litigation. The 
bidder, first, reduced the dollar value, but not the payment method, of the initial offer, The target rebuffed the 
bidder’s move. The bidder, then, raised the bid and altered the payment method,)
Stock Cash No No No
(No official reason was given. The bidder switched to a cash tender offer from a stock-swap offer.)
Combination
[45%, 55%] Stock No No No
(The bidder believed that majority of the target's shareholders would rather receive stock instead of cash because of
tax considerations.)
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions
The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the information theories of 
the medium of exchange in takeovers. Previous evidence supports the notion that the 
market, on average, revises downward the bidders' share prices upon announcements of 
equity-financed takeovers because the market interprets that managers would not use 
common stock to finance takeovers unless these managers believe their firms' shares to 
be overvalued in the market This dissertation extends this argument by integrating the 
theory o f financial intermediation into takeover literature. Consistent with the theory of 
financial intermediation, the evidence in this dissertation indicates that outside agents, 
particularly commercial banks, certify and monitor the bidder's decision to issue common 
stock to finance a takeover. In stock offers, the bidder's announcement excess returns 
are positively related to bidder's commercial banking relationship. The evidence on other 
financial intermediaries, such as accounting firms and investment banks, is not found.
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that the medium of exchange 
in takeovers conveys information about elements other than the bidders' value: i.e., the 
targets' value or the synergy from a takeover. This dissertation examines whether the 
medium of exchange conveys information about the value of the targets by testing 
whether revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for the targets in cash tender offers 
differ from those in tender offers involving stock as the method of payment. Cross- 
sectional results indicate that the forecast revisions in response to announcements of cash
120
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takeover bids are similar to those in reaction to announcements of takeover attempts 
involving stock as the method of payment. Thus, the evidence suggests that if there is 
any information conveyed by the medium of exchange in takeovers, the information is 
unlikely to be about the value o f the target's common shares.
The results based on changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers 
corroborate the argument that the choice of the method of payment conveys information 
about the value of the bidder's shares to the market. Parallel to Wansley, Lane, and 
Yang's (1987) finding that bidders earn more favorable excess returns in cash takeovers 
than in stock-financed takeovers, announcements of altering the medium of exchange in 
takeovers convey information about the value of the bidder's common shares. After 
controlling for changes in the takeover premium which accompany the revisions of 
payment terms, bidders' excess returns are approximately two percent higher for 
increases in the cash component (as a percentage of the acquisition price) than for 
increases in the stock component.
i
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Appendix
The purpose of Goldfeld-Quandt test is to determine whether there exists 
heteroscedasticity in error terms in equation (19). Such a heteroscedasticity occurs 
when variances of stock returns vary across firms. Specifically, when the diagonal 
elements of^=[ei ez — e>j]'«[ei 0 2 ... e^] are not all identical, heteroscedasticity exists. 
All covfe, 5 ), with fej, are assumed to be zero because (1) two different takeover 
announcements in the sample tend to occur at different calendar times, and (2 ) without 
any assumptions, Y is impossible to estimate given that there are (N+l)N/2 parameters 
in while there are only N observations (which is less than the number of parameters in
* ) .
If the test rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, weighted least squares 
procedure is employed to obtain the best linear unbiased estimator of the coefficients. 
That is, both dependent and independent variables are scaled by the standard error of 
estimation period residuals obtained from the market model.
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